

THE  
NATURE  
OF  
TRUTH

Its Union and Unity  
with the SOUL,

Which is  
One in its Essence, Faculties,  
Acts; One with TRUTH.

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Discussed by the Right Honorable  
ROBERT Lord BROOK,  
in a Letter to a private Friend.

By whom it is now published for  
the Publick Good.

---

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THE  
P R E F A C E

to the Reader, Shew-  
ing what first gave  
Birth to This Discourse  
of TRUTH.

READER,



Without an E-  
pithet : for,  
you must  
expect no  
complements. I am  
now a Pleader, and so  
am forbid προμαρτυρεω or  
εξω τι λεγειν : Yet, with  
submission to That Se-

A 4      vere

## The Preface

\* *Areopagus* : for,  
such were  
the orders  
for all  
Pleaders  
there: *A-*  
*ristotel.*  
*Rhet. lib. 1*  
*Lucian, in*  
*Anagars.*

vere Court\*, I hope  
'twill be no offence, by  
breaking their First In-  
junction, to keepe their  
Second. One Word  
then by way of Preface,  
may perhaps not seeme  
unseasonable, unne-  
cessary, and so not ἐξω  
τῆς πράξεως.

This Divine Dis-  
course of *Truth*, com-  
ming to me, from so  
Noble an Hand; I could  
not envy it the Publique  
Light: For, what heart  
could indure to stifle  
such a *Beauty*, at its first  
Birth, at its first Breath?  
Nay, though Cruelty  
should

Should scorne to take a  
check, yet Power it selfe,  
might plead impotent,  
for such an Act. For,  
*where*, or *who* is He, that  
can resist the struglings  
of Divine *Truth*, forcing  
its way out from the  
Wombe of Eternity?  
Where, or who is Hee  
that by a Viperous  
wreath\*, or other as-  
sault, can smother *Her-*  
*cules*, though yet but  
sprawling in his cradle?  
View then This new-  
borne *Beauty*; mark its  
Feature, proportion,  
lineaments; Tell mee  
now, was Its Birth an  
A 5 object

\* With  
such, I say'd to  
kill *Hercu-*  
*les* in his  
cradle, as  
the Poets  
say.

*The Preface*

object of pity? or rather of envy? at least admiration; for, Envy findes no place in Noble spirits.

One thing yet, I must excuse ( which yet indeed needs no excuse )  
A *Second Conception* is here *First* borne; yet not *Abortive*; no, but by mature thoughts, 'tis againe decreed, the elder shall serve the younger. For, *That* was meant the *Act*, *This* but the *Prologue*, ushering in *That* yet more curious Concept (if such be possible) which was an *Embryo* before

*to the Reader.*

before This, but is yet  
Vnborne.

The truth is, This  
Noble Lord (the Au-  
thor of this following  
Discourse ) having di-  
ved deep in those Pro-  
phetick Mysteries ( at  
which his first lines  
glauce, in this ) was e-  
ven forced ( by that oc-  
casion ) upon a more  
exact and abstract spe-  
culation of *Truth* it selfe;  
naked *Truth*, as in her  
selfe, without her gown,  
without her crown.

At first view, hee saw  
her sparkle with most  
glorious luster; But her  
Rayes

Matth. 24.  
Apocal. 10

*The Preface*

*Dionys. de  
Divinis No-  
minib.*

Rayes daz'led his eyes,  
so that he durst not, hee  
could not, enough be-  
hold, admire, and adore,  
her perfect Beauty, ex-  
act Proportion, Divine  
Harmony; yet though  
daz'led, he viewed still;  
remembring that of the  
Arcopagite \*, *Earthly  
Bodies are best seene in,  
and by, Light; But Spi-  
rituall Beausies, is sup-  
erly, in, and by, Divine  
Clouds, Divine Dark-  
nesse: This, This is the  
best Perspective to Di-  
vine Objects; and the  
Brightest Starres shine  
best, sparkle most, in  
the*

to the Reader.

the Darkest, the Blackest  
Night.

That which ravish'd  
his Soule most, and  
most inforc'd him more  
to pry, to adore more,  
Was, the experience of  
that which Plato speaks:  
*When our Soules (saith  
he) glance first upon Di-  
vine Light, they are soon  
ravisht, and cannot but pry  
more and more, because  
in it they see* *Συγγενεῖς* *τι,*  
*somewbat of Kin to them-  
selves. And this Kindred,*  
if I mistake not, is the  
neerest possible; more  
then Consanguinity; I  
had almost said more  
then

*Epist. ad  
Dionys.*

*The Preface*

See Plato's  
Parmenid.  
& Timæus.

then *Identity* it selfe. For,  
alas, that *Corporal Union*  
in Materials, which we  
miscall sometimes *Iden-*  
*tity*, is at best but a cold  
touch in a point or two; a  
most disdainful embrace  
(at greatest distance) in  
those Beings which  
have much *ἰσότης*, and  
but little *τ' αὐτό*, as *Plato's*  
Master taught him long  
agoe. But in *Spiritual*  
Beings, and in *These*  
only, is True Harmony,  
Exact Convenience, En-  
tire Identity, Perfect  
Union, to be found.

Such, even Such, is  
That neer Relation,  
That



to the Reader.

That neere Kindred between the *Soule* and *Truth*; as will fully appear in This following Discourse of *Truth*; ( which was never meant, nor now published, but as a *Prodromus* to a Future *Treatise* about *Prophetick Truth* revealed now in Scripture: ) Of which I shall only adde this; Read it; if it displease, Read it again, and yet again; and then judge. It needs not my Apology; if so, I might truly say, When 'twas first VVrot, 'twas intended but a Letter to

*The Preface*

✓ a private Friend, (not a Critick;) and since its first writing, and sending, 'twas never so much as perused, much lesse, refined, by its Noble Author.

✓ One VVord more I must speak, and so have done. If any Ingenuous Reader shall Dissent (in any Particular of Consequence) and freely, yet ingenuously, manifest the Reasons of his Dissent: Nothing can bee more gratefull to This Noble Lord, who promiseth the Fairest Answer, for,  
His

*to the Reader.*

His Aime is only *Search*  
of *Truth*; which, His  
Lordship well knows, is  
oft best found, as *Sparks*  
in the *Flint*, by much  
Contusion.


Yet, if any shall  
wrangle, not dispute:  
rudely thrust, or strike  
not like a Gentleman;  
His Return will be,  
only a *Rational Neglect*.

*F. S*

**R**ecensui tractatum hunc, qui  
inscribitur (The Nature of  
Truth,) per illustrissimum piissi-  
mumque Dominum, Robertum  
D. Brooke, editum: apprimè sanè  
Doctum, profundisque conceptibus  
insignitum: quapropter dignissi-  
mam arbitror qui in summam uti-  
litatem typis mandetur.

Novemb 19.  
1640.

Johannes Hansley,  
R. P. Episc. Lond.  
Capell. domest.



THE  
NATURE  
OF  
TRUTH.

Discussed in a Letter  
to a private  
Friend.

S I R,



Have according to  
my poore talent, ef-  
sayed to finde out  
the true sense of the Spirit  
in these \* two Chapters,  
and

\* Mat. 24.  
Rev. 20.  
Expoun-  
ded, in a-  
nother  
Treatise.

*The Nature of Truth.*

and in this Inquest, have improved the labours of the piously learned; from whom I have received little other favour than this, that they have not seduced me; they not having approached so neere to the truth, as to dazle it. I confesse, that Reverend, that bright man, Master *Brightman*, hath clothed his opinion, with such a Sirenian glory, that he had almost been to me an *ignis fatuus*. I had almost, in following the old, lost the young, lost the nest of Lapwings. But, with all respect to his Worth, (if I am not mightily mistaken) I have escaped that *Syriss*; and yet dare I not with the Philosopher cry out *ἑυχεται*; for, *\*who is fit for these things?*

\* 1 Cor. 2.  
16.

Every

*The Nature of Truth.*

Every truth is \*a myſte-  
ry; what muſt that be then,  
which is purpoſely veiled by  
the Spirit? *Jeſus Chriſt*, who  
is ſtyled in Scripture, the  
\*way, truth, life, light, ( and  
theſe things are apprehen-  
ded by ſenſe, and are com-  
mon ) is to \*the Jewes a  
ſtumbling block, and to the  
Greekes fooliſhneſſe.

May we not then juſtly ſay  
of him that dares pry into  
the Arke, with hopes and  
thoughts cleerly to unfold  
the myſterious, the prophe-  
ticall part of *Jeſus Chriſt*,  
to unknit the Gordian knot;  
May wee not ſay of him,  
what G O D ſaith of *Iob*;  
*who is this that darkeneth  
wiſedome with counſell?*

Alas, are we not all ſince  
Adams lapſe buried under  
the

*\*Veritas in  
ſuſpecto putei.  
Democr.*

*\*Ioh. 14. 6.*

*\*1 Cor. 1.  
23.*

*Iob 38. 2.*

### The Nature of Truth.

\* 1 Cor. 8. 2

the shadow of death, and lost in the region of darkness? Who is there that knoweth truth? \* *He that thinketh hee knoweth any thing, knoweth nothing as he should.*

✓  
.. Morall truth, which ( as some thinke ) is yet more within our reach, than those sacred mysteries, is unknown to us, both in the universall nature, and in the particular actions of it; *Difficilia quæ pulchra.*

Indeed *Truth* is that golden apple, which though it hath ( in some sense ) beene offered to the fairest; yet the most refined wits, the most high-raised fancies of the world, have courted her invaine, these many ages: For whilst they have sought, with



*The Nature of Truth.*

with a Palsie hand, this glorious star, through the perspective of thicke reason, they have either mounted too high, and confounding the Creator with the creature, made her God; or descending too low, and deserting the universal nature, have cōfined their thoughts to some individuall Truth, and restrained her birth to severall parcels within the Chaos.

✓  
A double  
errour in  
searching  
of truth.

THE





THE  
NATURE  
OF  
TRUTH.

Its union and unity  
with the SOULE.

CHAP. I.

*The Vnderstanding and the  
Truth-understood, are one.*

**T**RUTH is indeed  
of the seed Roy-  
all, of Progeny  
Divine: yet so, as  
to be ( for I may say of her,  
what the Spirit saith of  
B Faith)

\*Rom 10.8

Faith) \* neere us, to be in us. And when she is pleased to descend into our valleys, and to converse with us, shee erects her own pavilion, and doth fix it in whatsoever is lovely in us.

The *Vnderstanding* is her throne, there she reigneth, and as she is there seated, as she shineth in that part of the soule; she appeareth to me under two notions, which are also her measure through the whole sphere of Being; as will be discovered more hereafter, when these lesser streames shall have emptied themselves by progresse into a larger river.

First, that very *Being*, which immediatly floweth from above; and is the rise

or

or the first and uniforme ground-work in this particular Being, which we now treat of, and which under this notion wee call the *form or substance*.

Secondly, those workings which breathe from thence, as all actions and sayings, which are (in our phrase) *the effects of a reasonable soule*.

I shall first in few words treat of the first, and then very briefly conclude with a word or two upon the second part of Truth.

This first Truth is the *Understanding* in its Essence: for what is the *Understanding* other than a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conforming it to

The Understanding or Truth there, under two notions.

An argument proving the nature of the Understanding to be Truth.

the likenesse of the Creator? And is not Truth the same? For the Beauty of Truths character is, that she is a shadow, a resemblance of the first, the best forme; that she is *light*, the species, the sparkling of primitive *light*; that she is *life*, the sublimation of *light*, \* that she may reflect upon her selfe.

Vita est in  
se reflectio.  
Sen. Epist.  
Life a  
higher de-  
gree of  
light.

That she is *light*, none will deny; that *light* in reasonable creatures is the fountaine of *life*, is manifest. For the forme of a reasonable soule is *light*, and therefore when the soul informeth and giveth *life* to *Animal rationale*, it enableth the creature to work according to *light*, and upon Her accesses the organs  
can

can entertaine *light*, as the eye then beholds the *light* of the Sun; upon Her retirements they are dark and uselesse. Thus whilst *life* is *light*, and *light* is Truth, and Truth is conformity to God; and the *understanding* as we yet discourse of it, is this *light* to the soule, the *Vnderstanding* and Truth can be but one.

The eye  
by the pre-  
sence of  
the soule  
made able  
to see  
light.

CHAP. II.

*The second Argument, pro-  
ving that truth is the Na-  
ture of the Vnderstanding.*

**W** Know the learned choose rather to stile the understanding, a *faculty*; and so institute a soule recipient; a

Most call  
the under-  
standing a  
faculty.

B 3 Being

Being (*scil.* Truth) received; and a faculty, which is the *understanding*, whereby the soule receiveth and acteth according to what it doth entertaine.

But with submission to their better judgement, I should crave leave to make one *Quere*.

Are there not to the constitution of every Being three notions requisite?

Three notions requisite to the constitution of every Being.

First, the Fountain communicating.

Secondly, the Channell entertaining.

Thirdly, the Waters imparted.

I confesse, we must not in Metaphysicall Beings expect Physicall subsistencies; yet *and* all learning doth allow of. But where shall



shall wee finde these in the *understanding*, whilst the intellect passeth under the notion of a *faculty*? Indeed wee may discern the last (*scil.*) those sweet beames of *light*, which beat upon us continually.

But where is the Second, which entertaineth them? If it be the *understanding*, then the *light*, which differēceth us from the vegetative and sensitive creatures, lieth in the *understanding*, and not in the soule; and the soule (which all men hold to be a spirituall Being) is but a *Theca* to the intellect, as the body is the Tabernacle of the soule. Or, if the soule hath *light*, as well as the *understanding*, then are there two enlightened Beings in

The understanding as a faculty affordeth not these 3. notions.

The understanding is not the subject of truth.

Marti. l. 5.  
epi. 53.

The understanding receiveth not truth from the soule,

one reasonable creature : *Non belle quadam faciunt duo, sufficit unus Huic operi.* Two reasonable Beings in one *Compositum*, is too unreasonable a thing.

Thirdly, Who is it that communicateth this *light* ? It is conveyed to the *understanding* either from the soule, or some other way.

If from the soule, then the soule doth not finde the defect of the *understanding*. For, if the soule can communicate *light*, then hath it *light* already ; the same, or more excellent ; then can it worke, diffuse *light*, and enjoy it selfe ; and so this faculty, the *understanding*, shall be in vaine.

If in any other way, it must either be immediately from

from God, or *mediante Crea-  
tura.*

If from a creature, and not from the soule, it must be by some other facultie intervenient. For, if the soule (which by their consent is a more noble Agent than the *understanding*) cannot, according to their Doctrine, act without a faculty; how shall an inferior Being work, without some such like subservient help? And thus may you *excurrere in infinitum*, which, according to the Philosophers, may not be done; for, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda, nisi necessario.*

If the truth come from God, then why is it not immediately, intrinsically, infused into the  
B 5 soule

Not from  
any crea-  
ture

V

V

Not from  
God.

*Deus agit  
à centro in  
circum'e-  
rentiam,*

In spiritu-  
all giving  
and recei-  
ving there  
must be a  
metaphysi-  
call union

soule it selfe? But how-  
ever the *understanding* bee  
enriched with this treasure  
of Truth, if it be imparted  
to it, then is it, it selfe that  
Truth, that *light* which I  
contend for. For God doth  
not communicate *light* (by  
*light* (which I take in a Me-  
taphoricall sense) I under-  
stand some spirituall excel-  
lency; and such *light*, I say,  
God doth not offer) but to  
*light*. For, *quicquid recipi-  
tur, recipitur ad modum reci-  
pientis*. Cleopatra her dissol-  
ved Vnyon would have been  
to Esops cocke of lesse  
value than a barley corne.  
And if the *understanding*  
have not *light*, it cannot  
take it, unlesse by being tur-  
ned into the nature of it.  
For what Giving or Recei-  
ving

ving can here be, besides that which maketh Both to become one and the selfe same? *Light came into the world, but it was refused by darknesse. Ignoti nulla cupido.*

John 1.5.

Thus the *understanding* and *light* are different in names, may be different in degrees, but not in nature. For what that Learned man *Doctor Twisse* saith most acutely of a spirituall gift, I may say of spirituall *light*. The soule cannot refuse a spirituall gift (I now speak in his phrase.) The soule and any spirituall Being doe not, as corporeall things, greet each other by the help of the *Loco-motive* faculty; but when Grace is given by *God* to the soule, there

i Doct. of Syn. Dort. p. 25. lin. 12  
Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent, unless they bee made inherent in the soule, and the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the soule.

To receive  
light is to  
be light.


there is, as it were (*de-veni-  
am vocis*) an hypostaticall  
union betwixt the gift and  
the soule; and the soule  
cannot reject it; because  
they are no more Two but  
one. So to be in the capa-  
city or act of receiving  
light, is to be light.

Lastly, how passeth this  
light from the *understand-  
ing* to the soule? Will not  
here be left as vast a gulfe,  
as they make betweene the  
*understanding* and the *will*,  
which make them divers;  
whence grow those inex-  
tricable disputes, How the  
the *will* is made to *under-  
stand*, what the *understand-  
ing* judgeth fit to bee wil-  
led?

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

*A prosecution of the second Argument, wherein these three notions are applied to the understanding, being made one with the truth.*

 If these rubs are easily taken out of the way, if you make that which you call the *understanding, truth*. For then have you,

First, the Father of mercies, dispensing *light* and *truth*.

Secondly, *light* and *truth* dispensed.

Thirdly, the *totum existens*, consisting of matter and forme, of materiall and immateriall Beings (as wee distin-

If you make the understanding light, you have the three notions which make up every Being.

distinguish them) called a *reasonable creature*, thus informed or constituted, which we name the *recipient of this light and truth*.

1 The 4<sup>th</sup>  
viall men-  
tioned  
Rev. 16. 8.  
is the thing  
emptying  
and empti-  
ed upon  
it selfe.

Do not tell me, that I thus make the *recipient* and *thing received* all one; that is not strange in emanation divine. In Scripture you have a parallel of this. The fourth viall is poured out upon the Sun (*scil.*) the Scriptures, and the Scriptures are the viall it selfe; the Scripture is emptied upon it selfe, it is agent and patient, receiver and received. I know learned *Mede* to prevent this, which to him is a difficulty, imagineth the Emperour to be the Sun; but in two words that is thus disproved.

First,



First, the Emperour is no where called the Sun in this book; when he receiveth a metaphoricall typicall title, he is called the Dragon.

Secondly the Scriptures are in the *Revelation* divers times set forth to us by the Sun. So that if you refuse the sense which I fix upon, then you doe not onely forsake, but oppose the Scripture-phrase.

But were not this truth mounted in a celestiaall chariot, *Reason* it selfe would evince it. For, consider any individual Being you please, vegetative or ratiōall, or what you will, who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being it selfe which is entertained? Who is it that

Nay in all things, Agent and Patient must bee one, to him that considers. No Being but it is the thing receiving & received

that receiveth from the womb of Eternity that reasonable creature, but the creature received?

The vanity of that question, Whether the soule be *continens* or *contentum*, discovered

The ignorance of this Point, hath raised that empty Question, Whether the Soule or the Body be *contentum*? For if every Being be its own *contentum*, this Question will seeme to be no more a difficulty. And if there happen any neare union betwixt two Beings, as the Body and the Soule, the first is not *continens*, the other *contentum*; but as husband and wife, each bringeth his part towards the making up of the *compositum*.

Thus without any violation of Reasons right, I seeme justly to conclude, that

that the *totum existens*, consisting of matter and forme, the *reasonable creature*, is the *Recipient* of this truth.

CHAP. IIII.

*This Argument further cleared by more objections propounded and answered.*

**B**UT still it is demanded, why may not the *understanding* supply the third place? why may it not be this *Recipient*?

To whom I give this answer; That if they make the *understanding* but a quality, and depending upon some other Being, it cannot, as I have proved in this Discourse,

The Understanding cannot be the recipient.

Some call  
the Intel-  
lect *virtus*  
*quâ*.

The Intel-  
lect can-  
not be *vir-*  
*tus quâ*.

course, be the *recipient*: but if they look upon it as this *light*, this *truth* it selfe, then the dispute is reconciled.

Some conceive, all these difficulties are cured, if you make the *understanding* only *virtus quâ*, concluding with the Philosopher, that *ibi subsistendum est*, without inquiry after a further progreſſe. I could *Iurare in verbamagistri*, I could acquiesce here, but that I desire to be convinced by reason and not by termes. I shall therefore humbly ask this question.

What difference is there betwixt *virtus quâ* and a faculty? as in a knife, the cutting ariseth from the sharpnesse, and this sharpnesse is *virtus quâ*, or the faculty whereby the knife doth cut.

If

If it be but a faculty, then I repaire to my former answere : but if something else than a faculty, it must either be a nominall Being, or reall existence.

If the first, it beareth no weight.

If the second, then I say, it must entertaine species ( for all spirituall glories doe operate by the communication of their divine species ) and then will you be cast upon the former rock.

Yet still they say, the *understanding*, being a spirituall Being, receiveth light in some way which we know not; and so they proceede to obscure distinctions and voluminous discourses, concerning *intellectus agens* & *intel-*

As the A-  
rabians,  
Zabarell,  
&c.

The last  
objection  
answered.

\* Act. 17.  
vers. 23.

*intellectus patiens* or *passibilis*. But the wiser sort of them, perceiving the thinnesse, aerialnesse and crazinesse of this Spiders web, have with greater probability made *God* to be *intellectus agens*, by his influence upon the understanding.

*Respon.* Is not this the Athenian Altar, which groaned under that Superscription, \* *To the unknowne God?* I would I could discover with *S. Paul* to them this light, this truth, which they know not, that they might love it and imbrace it. But secondly, I dispute not against things I know not: They know not this. I know that I may better maintaine the other, that the Understanding is *not* the Recipient  
of

of this light, than they averre  
that *it is*, in a way whereof  
they never hope to finde a-  
ny footsteps.

CHAP. V.

*The Soule and truth in the  
Soule are one.*

**M**ay yet be pressed  
with this objection:  
All these difficulties  
may be urged against the  
*Soule*, which have been pro-  
duced against the *Vnder-  
standing*.

*Resp.* Are not these like  
the untrue Mother, who  
will kill the childe, because  
she cannot call it her own?  
If these inconveniences be  
justly urged against the *Soul*,  
it

v  
..

The Soul,  
Vnder-  
standing,  
Truth, all  
but one.

✓

it will not deliver the *Vnderstanding*. But I will deale ingenuously, and confesse that if you take the Soule under any other notion than Truth; If you deeme it, first to be a Being, and then to be light, as God made *Adam* first (I meane the body) and then breathed life into him; if, I say, there be first a Being, and then an infusion of light, you will be pressed with the former arguments. But if you make the *Understāding*, the Soul, Light, Truth, one, then are you quite delivered out of all these straights; and then is it true which I averre, that, that degree of light, which we enjoy in the inward man, is the *specificall difference*, which distinguisheth



sheth between us and brutes, deservedly called *Reason*, that ample Sphere of Truth, which is the *All* in us, and besides which we are wholly nothing.

Are not wee said to be made after the image of God? and if in any thing we are honoured with this inscription, it is in the most noble part? Now God is *unus, purus, simplex actus*. For (with submission to his better learning and judgement) I cannot subscribe to Dr Ames his manner of expression, who saith, first there is God, and then his attributes are in him, \* *tantum in esse secundo*. If then we

An Argument proving the Soule and Truth to be one.

God and his attributes are not two.

\* *Deo insunt quasi in esse secundo, ab*

*essentia & inter se distinguuntur non solum ratione ratiocinante, sed etiam ratiocinata, ita ut fundamentum distinctionis sit in ipso Deo. Theo. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect. 27. 28.*

doe

do beare his impresse, *quam non passibus equis*, it must be in that which is ( as farre as we can judge ) *DEI formalis ratio*, which is to be *purus, simplex actus*.

\* 1 Ioh. 3.  
verf. 2.

In this our shadowy resemblance of the Deity, I shall not challenge perfection; for though the Scripture say, \* *we shall hereafter be perfect as he is perfect*, and doth here style us, *partakers of divine nature*; yet all this is to be understood according to our little modell. Unity is that wherein wee carry some touches, some lineaments of his Majesty. Unity is Gods Essence. Unity is all what we are. For division being the birth of nothing, can be nothing. And thus may we raise from  
our

our Microcosme, a passable Hieroglyphick of the Trinity.

*Truth* as it is in the breast of Eternity intended to the Sonnes of men, resembles *Patrem intelligentem* ; as it descends from above, *Filium intellectum* ; as it informeth the Soule, enjoyeth and reflecteth upon it selfe, *Spiritum dilectum*. We must not then expect, First, a Being of the Soule : Secondly, a faculty whereby it worketh. *God* and his attributes, are but one; mercy and justice kisse each other in him; he and they are *ens necessarium* ; And so the Soule and the Faculty is one, that divine light and truth.

Truth as it hath been described, resembles the Trinity.

✓

## CHAP. VI.

*All things are this one light  
or truth, shining from God.*

**B**Ut if the Intellect,  
the Soul, Light and  
Truth are (from the  
reasons alledged) *all* but  
one, this argument will  
presse all things that are;  
then will all Being fall un-  
der the same Predicament.

This is that which I ay-  
med at; and why not? See-  
ing that. First, all Being is  
derived from the same foun-  
taine, *scil.* from him who is  
uniforme, in all like him-  
selfe.

Secondly, All Being is  
the same in nature, (*scil.*)  
a beame of that excellent  
light,

light, and therefore in Metaphysicks \* *Truth* and *Being* are one.

Thirdly, All *Being* is entertained in the same manner by every individuall existence, which is the subject receiving this light from above : and all reall true reception is alone by similitude and union of nature.

Yet I shall not agree to confound the names of particlular *Beings*, though I doe conjoyne their natures. For, all *Being* may be compared to *light* ; in such a body it is styled the *Sunne* ; in another it is called the *Moone* ; in the third it beareth the name of a *Starre*, and under various shapcs, the names of various *Stars*,

\* *Unum, verum, bonum, Ens, terminiconvertibiles.*  
All being is this truth.

as *Syrus, Canopus, &c.* but all is *light*, and it is but *light*. The body of waters is by us called *Seas*; when they beate upon such a coast, it beareth one name; when it coasteth upon another soyle, it receiveth a severall denominati-  
 on. All Being is this *light*, this *truth*; but contained within those Circles, it appeareth to us under this name; and againe, it hath another stile when it bea-  
 eth upon a various object.

All Being is but *light*, communicating it selfe to us through severall cran-  
 nies, some greater, some lesse, whilst all is *light*.

\* *Plato* most excellently, most acutely, most truly hath made all Being of *Ter-  
 minus* and *Infinitem*.: The  
 first

\* *Vide Pla-  
 tonem in  
 Phile. in Ti-  
 meo. Ter-  
 minus, In-  
 finitum,  
 prima ele-  
 menta, un-  
 de quin-  
 que gene-  
 ratione n.*

first Being appearing to us in severall bounds and measures amidst the vast infinity of darknesse or nothing.

The Platonick Philosophers do not erre, who reduce all Beings to number, making *one* all and the chief, and the other more or lesse glorious, as they have two, three, or foure, more or lesse numbers or degrees.

Whence they had this Maxime, I know not; this I know, Satan, that old Serpent, is very learned, and can sometimes (as he doth, when hee calls Jesus the Christ and sonne of God) can, I say, sometimes, tell true, that so hee may even by truth entaile to himselfe a certaine interest in such Disciples as refuse any

C 3 other

*Ficin. com.  
in Timæo.  
Vide l'la.  
tonem ubi-  
que.  
Omnes  
numeri in  
unitate.*

r Virg. in  
 papuax.  
 Quia nu-  
 merus im-  
 par, nume-  
 rus indivi-  
 sibilis. Ficin.  
 commen.  
 in Plat.  
 Timæ.

other allurements than that  
 of golden truth: and it is  
 to be feared, that they have  
 had too great and free con-  
 verse with him. For even  
 this sweet point of learning  
 have they shamefully abu-  
 sed to charms and spells, as  
 that of the Poet, *Numero  
 Deus impare gaudet*. Two  
 was curst, because it first  
 departed from unity; Three  
 whereby unity againe re-  
 turned into it selfe, became  
 sacred.

But it may be (*& spero  
 meliora*) that they received  
 it from the Egyptians, and  
 the Egyptians from the He-  
 brews.

Now, if this be true,  
 (which I submit to the  
 judgement of the wise) then  
 all Being is but one, and all  
 things



things are more or lesse excellent, as they partake more or lesse of this first Being.

This doctrine of Platonists will not be so unfavoury, if we pay unto *unity* its due tribute. I confesse, according to true Philosophy, Time is but *mensura motus vel ordinis*, which both are the same; Number, *calculus temporis*; One is *principium tantum numeri*, and so it is hardly a part of that which is but the handmaid of circumstance.

CHAP. VII.

*How unity is all in all things.*

**B**Ut I should desire that we might consider whether it doth not carry something in

The excellency of unity.

it, in nature more glorious, something that may seem to informe a Being. If I cannot tell what it is, you will excuse me, knowing how hard a thing it is to finde out the Forme of any Being, and how much more hard to discover the Being of a Forme.

But from this reason I doe seeme to collect some glimmering light of what I now propound.

All Being seemeth to breath and catch after *unity*. *Gravia* doe not more naturally incline downwards, than all Being doth naturally seeke for *unity*.

Of Beings there are but two sorts.

Uncreated.

Created.

Un-

Uncreated, is God only.

Created, is

Spirituell.

Morall.

Physicall.

Mathematicall.

In all these you will find  
Unity as it were the Forme  
of their Being.

My thoughts, my ignorance,  
my no thoughts of the first,  
incomprehensible, inaccessible  
Majesty, I desire to propound  
with fear, trembling and reverence.

If *Iohn* in the midst of  
revelation, being overcome  
with nothing but the glitterings  
and sparklings of the creature,  
did mistake, and worshipped  
one of his fellow-servants;  
if the Jewes refused to trample  
upon any contemptible scroul, fearing

*Rev. 22. 9.*

lest, in them, the namelesse name of God might be included: surely wee in the midst of darknesse, having to doe, not with the name, but with the nature of Eternity, ought to cloathe our spirits with much modestie.

I shall therefore humbly propound this to consideration, Whether *unity* be not *all in God*.

I confesse there are three persons in one Godhead (and that is the mysterie) and yet but one God. And more there could not have beene; for this God is infinite, eternall, &c. and onely one can be so; there cannot bee two Infinites, two Eternities.

And againe, this *one* cannot

not be otherwise, for if hee could have been something else, hee had not beene infinite.

If then *unity* bee such a necessary (give us leave to speake as wee can) accident, as, without which God could not have been what hee is: may it not bee said that *unity* is co-essentiall to him, seeing that the Deity admits of no accidents? And if of his Essence, then *unity* is in him all, for the Essence of God is all in God, and God in his Essence is but one *Divinity*.

Vnity all  
in God.

*Ob.* But so, infinity, power, &c. all attributes are in God his Essence, as well as *unity*?

*Ans.* All other attributes

butes are at length resolved into this of unity. Of this, can be given no accompt, but only negative. All explications flow from this, returne to this, that God is one.

*Fic. comment. in  
Plat. Sym-  
pos.*

What is it to be infinite? *Ficinus* answers, to have nothing of privation mixt, to be *plenus sui*; which is to be *One*.

The power of God is the unity of all Being in *one point*. What is this, *I am that I am*; but this, *I am one*? The same we may say of all other the names of God.

Unity in  
spirituall  
Beings.

When we survey the nature of spirituall Beings, we shall find them in Scripture stiled *one*. For God reduceth all the commandements

dements to love. And the Saints, who are, *quatenus* Saints, spirituall Beings, (for their Saintship is a spirituall excellency) are stiled, *Rom. 12. 5. one body*; and, *Gal. 3. 16. they are all one in Iesus Christ.*

Christ and his Church are but one body. Now, this *union* carrieth certainly something with it more essentiall than a figure.

When the three persons are united in one deity, the *union* is more close than a figurative *union*. The conjunction of the humane nature, and the second person in the Trinity, is a very entire conjunction; and so is that of the Saints with Christ. There is the union of the whole humane nature

ture with one person. Here is the union of divers persons to the whole divine nature. And we may easily allow a neare union to these Metaphysicall Beings: seeing even in naturall things, there is as it were an unity, even of two Physicall existences. For G O D saith, *You two shall be one flesh*; he saith not one, but one flesh. But these are *anigmata*, while we see through glasses of flesh.

Gen. 2. 24.

1 Cor. 13.

12

Morall.

Seeing Morall Beings are, by generall consent, of fraternall alliance to spirituall, both in nature and operation; I shall not say any thing of them, but onely what is said by all, that *virtutes sunt concatenate*.

I shall therefore minde  
you



you but of this, how in Physicall Beings, every thing doth delight in unity. And this is very plaine in the stillicids of water, which, if there be water enough to follow, will draw themselves into a small thred, because they will not sever: and when they must disunite, then they cast themselves into round drops, as the figure most resembling unity.

Whence is that Sympathy in nature betwene the Earth and the Adamant, but from hence, that they being of one nature, desire to improve their unity by mutuall imbraces?

When have the Sun-beams their vigor and efficacy, beating upon the burning glasse,  
but

Vainie in  
Physicall  
Beings.

but when the glasse hath gathered them all into one ?

Where is the power of our five senses, which are in their nature so honourable, that *nihil cadit in intellectum, quod non prius cadit in sensum* ? Where is their vertue, but in *communis sensus* ? Nay (if I durst be so bold) but this I may not now dispute: I conceive all the senses are but one, and that is \* *Tactus*. For their Energie is nothing till the ray from the object to the organ, and from the organ to the object touch in one.

It is most happily expressed by Sir John Suckling ;

[who having drawn the breasts  
of wit and fancie drie,

May

\* I am informed that my Lord Castleton in his booke d: *Veritate*, affirmeth that there is but one sense: but I am not so happy as to have that booke by me, nor doe I remember it since my last reading it, so that I dare not say it confidently.

*May justly now write Man,  
must not a Suckling die.]*

When he saith,  
*The circumambient aire doth  
make us all  
To be but one bare Indivi-  
duall.*

What are the Mathema-  
ticall sciences, but *Vnity*  
turning it selfe into severall  
formes of *Numbers* and *Fi-  
gures*, yet still remaining  
entire ? *Harmony*, pro-  
portion, proportionality,  
which are the subject, the  
soule of all Knowledge  
here, are so many severall  
names of the same unity.  
Beauty is but one act of  
grace and sweetnesse, which  
seemes to us composed of  
various parcels. \*Musick is  
one

Sir Iohn  
Suckling in  
his Play,  
Act 2,  
Scene 1.

✓  
Vicin. Com.  
ment. in  
Sympof.  
Plat.  
\*Vicin. Com-  
ment. in  
Sim. Plat.

one forme resulting from many different sounds. This is that mystery, which unknowne, hath confounded the Schools in that Question, whether quantity be *divisibilis in semper divisibile*. All things are certainly at last reduced to an *Unity*; yea, all things appeare to us cloathed with one forme; yet are we never able to search out the perfection of this, when we most accurately pursue it. The glory and majesty thereof is such, that it rendreth our minds incapable of any more than a grosse view, like that of the Sunne in his splendour.

*Democritus* his definition of Being, is very considerable, \**Est aliquid differens à se,*

\* *Plato in  
symp. in  
Grat. Eri-  
sym.*

*esse, quod sibi convenit:* and indeed, all Being is but one, taking various shapes, sometimes discovering it selfe under one, sometimes under another, whereas it is but one Being : and this is light, truth, that (as I said before) beame of divine glory, which is the spring of all Beings.

To close this discourse, give me leave thus to set forth that Majesty, whereby Unity wrappeth up all things within it selfe. There can be no recedence from Unity, unlesse by addition of a new, distinct, Unity. But where will you finde This? A simple Unity must be entirely one with the First ; if you adde any thing to Unity, whereby it may differ,  
it

Nominall  
division of  
Being re-  
quisite for  
our con-  
verse.

it remaines no more One,  
but becomes a Duality.

Yet doe I in no wise re-  
ject that division of Being  
left us by our Masters,  
when they teach us, that  
there is first a Being which  
is knowne to Be, but it selfe  
in its Being is insensible.

Secondly, another that  
is sensible, but knoweth not  
its owne excellency.

Thirdly, that which know-  
ing its owne excellency,  
can reflect upon it selfe.  
For, I say, this which is cal-  
led vegetative, sensitive, and  
rationall, is all of one na-  
ture.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

*The nature of Habits.*

**A**Nd whilst I affirme  
that the soule is  
nothing but this  
*Truth*, I doe not refuse the  
doctrine of *Habits*, either  
*Infused* or *Acquisite*.

For when the soule by  
vertue of its Being, is cleare  
in such a truth, it is said to be  
an infused habit. When by  
frequent action, such a truth  
is connaturall to the soule,  
it may be stiled an habit  
acquisite: though indeed all  
is but light more or lesse  
glorious, discovering it  
selfe frequently or rarely,  
and by divine appointment,  
at

Habits in-  
fused, ac-  
quisite.

at such a conjunction of time, and not any other, not that the soule is informed by its owne action; for what hath the streame which it derives not from the source? What can those workings adde to that, from which they receive themselves?

And therefore I wholly subscribe to the Platonists, who make all *scientia* nothing but *reminiscentia*; for when it appeareth not, it is not; the soule being but an activity. it must be no more than it acteth: and though we seeme by frequent actings to helpe the soule, and so to create in it acquisite habits, yet these are but a *Phenomenon*. This is but the way  
which



which God discloseth to our eye, whereas all the actings are onely new discoveries.

Our Philosophers affirme thus boldly of the unreasonable creature, attributing it all to the instinct, or a new influence.

Why may not, why must not we conclude the same of man, seeing it is a received truth, that *acti agimus*, and we are in our strength in regard of God no better than the most abject creature?

But if *all* be one; (Soule, Understanding, Habits, all the same:) then neither doe faith and reason differ.

Surely they differ onely in degrees, not in nature.

That Reverend holy man,  
that

The difference between naturall and supernaturall habits.

that dexterous *cominus-pugnator*, seemeth to averre the same or more in historicall and saving faith\*.

\* Mr Bail.  
Divers sorts

of Faith. page 3. Faith signifying beleeve, is used to note, first an ordinary knowledge and bare assent to the historicall truth of the Speaker, though sometimes holpen by experiments, and other inducements and probabilities of the things: and this is called Faith Historicall, that is, a naked, imperfect, dead assent, without trust or confidence in the mercies of God, or adherence to the commandments. Howbeit we must not imagine, that Faith is reputed unsound or not salvificall, because Historicall (rather it is oftentimes unsufficient to save, because it is not so fully Historicall as might be) but the name of Historicall Faith arose hence, that some are said to beleeve, who did never embrace Christ as their only Saviour with all their hearts, nor confidently rely upon the promises of mercy; otherwise, justifying Faith doth more certainly beleeve the truth of the history of the Gospel, and so is more historicall than the Faith called Historicall.

\* These  
meanes  
reach us  
further

Mr Huit in his Anatomy  
of Conscience, cleerely af-  
firmeth it. \*

to make much of the least beginnings of grace, even those which Divines commonly call repressing, since they prepare the heart to conversion, and in some sense

sense be called the inchoation thereof: seeing temporary and living faith differ not in forme, but degrees of perfection; there is a faith in the true convert, of no better perfection than that in the temporary, though he stay not there, as the other (being an unwise son) doth. *Huit Anat. Conscience pag. 214.*

The first degree is Reason.

A second. Historicall.

A third, Temporary.

A fourth, Saving faith.

A fifth, Plerophoric.

A sixth, \**Beatifica visio*,  
that *light whereby we shall see*  
*as we are seene*; these are of  
the same nature with that  
light which a reprobate is  
partaker of.

\* 1 Ioh. 3.  
vers. 2.

And if any man question  
the truth of this, let him but  
consider, that the Donor is  
the same, our good God.

The Efficient, Instrumental, and Formall cause, is Jesus Christ.

D

The

The subject recipient, the  
*totum existens*.

And the Gift it selfe is  
*light or truth*, a spirituall  
*Being*.

How can it choose then,  
but to be one and the same,  
seeing (as I said before) such  
a Recipient cannot enter-  
tain any other guest?

Neither doe I at all abert  
that unhappy opinion of  
falling away from Grace.

There is in the opinion a  
*liquid nefasti*, and therefore  
I study to shun it. The pro-  
pugnators of it are unhap-  
py; for they have not onely  
made a rent amongst us, but  
strengthened a common ad-  
versary.

The oppugnators also are  
unhappy; for they have so  
managed the cause, that their  
Adver-

The con-  
troverſie  
about fall-  
ing from  
Grace.

Adversaries lie almost under invincible darknesse : for the oppugners fearing to speake plaine, have called *Spontaneitatem, liberam voluntatem*, and it is impossible to distinguish betweene *Libera voluntas Contra-Remonstrantium, & liberum arbitrium Remonstrantium*.

And whilst the *Remonstrants* finde no difference in this main Tenet, they weigh all the rest in the same scale, and judge accordingly. For an argument often alledged by many learned men, if it confuteth not, it doth confirme an error ; and thus are they out of the reach of truth.

That learned, that pious man, the first fruit of our Church her resurrection, fa-

mous Calvin, styled it *Spon-  
taneitatem*, and not *liberam  
voluntatem*: For, *Deus* and  
*libera voluntas* are incompat-  
tible, not to be cemented by  
that distinction without dif-  
ference, *Libera à necessita-  
te, sed non ab infallibilitate*.  
And therefore mighty \*Rut-  
terfort affirmeth, that *positio  
Dei decreto absoluto* (and all  
things are under such a de-  
cree) *insulse queritur an po-  
tentia libera sub eo decreto sit  
indifferens*.

\* Deo enim,  
sive scienti-  
am eius spe-  
clemus,  
quippe om-  
nia scit;  
sive volun-  
tatem, quæ  
ad nihil cre-  
atum vel

creabile est suspensa, sed a' aeterno determinata, nulla est  
potentia disiunctiva: considerari quidem potest potentia  
creata, non considerato divino decreto, & in signo ratio-  
nis decretum Dei antecedente. Sed in tali Chimærica  
consideratione, adversarij nobis licet vitiosâ nuce haud  
emptitandam frustra ferunt. Ac verò actu, non est ulla po-  
tentia creata, nisi quæ sub est aeterno DEI decreto, nisi quis  
a' Deos divinæ providentiæ renuntiare velit, &c. Rutter.  
Exerc. Apolog. Exerc. 1. c. 1. Sect. 8.

But

But here I am not to, I cannot, dispute this question. Onely I say thus much, it is so unhappy an opinion, that I hope I shall not at all abett it.

For though Reason and Faith be one in nature: yet is not *reason* that degree of *light*, of which the Spirit hath said, *My seed is in you, and you cannot sinne.* And therefore men cannot lose that which they never had. And this will be a little more cleere, by the answer to the next objection, which is this.

If Faith and Reason, if knowledge and grace be all but one light, how cometh it to passe, that some who have lesse light, have more faith, and those again,

1 Ioh. 3. 9.  
Difference  
betwixt  
Knowledg  
and Faith.

*Object.*

who are for knowledge, as Angels of light, are not partakers of that which is called *Saving faith*?

This difficulty is rather mazy, than strong; I shall therefore hope to bring the Ariadnean thread.

And at first aboord, I deny the proposition. I conceive it a mistake. For I doe verily beleeve, that the weakest Saint knoweth more of God, than the most intelligent of those Spirits, who though once in heaven, are now in intolerable flames.

All men confesse thus much, that even the meanest Christian, hath more experimental knowledge of GOD, than *Beelzebub* the Prince of the aire. And doth not this convince them of what



what I affirme ? For what ( to speake in their language ) is experiment, but the daughter of light, gathered by frequent observation ? If experiment be but light, and their experience is more than that of the greatest wits ; then ( if I mistake not ) by necessary consequence, their light is more and greater.

But I suppose, the error may be cleared by this Simile.

The one is as the man who hath studied the Theory, the other the Practicke of any art or science.

The first may know more *in appearance* ; but the other indeed knoweth more.

You shall finde two unequally learned, The first is

D 4

a

Experi-  
ence, col-  
lection of  
particular  
lights.

Knowledg,  
{ reall.  
{ appa-  
rent,

a Gnosticke, a *hellus literarum*; the other hath not read so much, but hath concocted, mastered and subdued all before him. Which now is said to know more?

Psal. 14. 1.

*The foole hath said (not, as some expound it, wished) in his heart, there is no GOD. It is true, now and then he hath some glimmering light of a Deity, but anon againe all is shaken, and he saith, there is no God.*

Psal. 12. 4.

Doth not the people of Israell say, *Wee are our owne Lords, who shall controll us?* We have made a covenant with death and hell, and none shall reach us. Can these men, these Beings be said to know God?

If you object the devils age and experience, it cannot

not help ; it is but , as you call it , a collection of his owne lights , and all the starres shining together make not day.

I should onely aske this one question, *Can the devils beleeve or know God to be all mercy?* It is impossible, because they cannot beleeve him so to themselves.

*Ob.* But some say, Neither doe the best men beleeve him so to the wicked.

*Resp.* Yes, we doe , wee know him in his nature to be mercifull to them.

Besides, mercy and justice are all but one thing in God ; and this those miserable Creatures cannot consent to, that their ruine is the effect of supreme perfection, infinite sweetnesse.

God, mercy and sweetnesse to the devils.

To the confirmation of this, I shall but presse this one consideration.

As wee  
know, wee  
love.

If they did *know* more than the Saints, they must needs *love* more; and in this I shall have all those my abettors, who hold that the *Will* doth necessarily follow the *understanding*; which whilst *Aristotle* denieth in broad and open disputes, he doth in tacite termes closely yeeld to.

Διτρίβει ὁ  
σπουδαῖος  
τῷ τᾷ λα-  
θεῖς ἐν τᾷ  
σιν ὁρᾷν  
καὶ ὅτι  
μέτρον ὡς  
Arist. Eth.  
lib 3. c. 6.  
vide & c. 7.  
ci. ca fi-  
nem.

I doe apprehend it an undeniable truth, that what Good soever I know to be good, I must love. And therefore if wicked men did know more of God, they must know him needs under the notion of good: and so Seeing goodnesse in his nature, they must love him

✓

him more. I might adde, what good we know, we are: our act of understanding being an act of *union*, which (as before) being Metaphysicall in the soule, must be entire.

What we know, we are.

CHAP. IX.

*The difference betwixt Knowledge and affection, discussed.*

**I**T may be that what hath beene disputed, will be granted: but there is yet an objection which requireth solution.

*Ob.* If all Being differeth onely in degrees, not nature; if knowledge, affection,

fection, light, activity, bee all one; Whence is it that even amongst Christian men, holy, spirituall men, men of largest affections, (and the affections are the activity, the maine of the Soule) I say men of the largest affections are esteemed to know least of God? And others, whose affections are as it were benumbed, and all activity is placed in their braine, understand more of the divine nature?

Doth it not appeare from hence, say they, that all Being is not one, differing onely in degrees: but that there are even different natures, amongst which one may excell, whilst the other is deprest?

Sol. I could tell these  
men

men, who start the objection, that they deeme the *light* in the head, more than the *love* in the heart : and then I shall say, that with them the head is the higher degree, the heart the lower degree of light, and so all is but a different light; from whence, affection, being judgement in its infancy, ceaseth, when Knowledge groweth mature : as the heate and blaze of fire, is but its labouring towards purity and perfection, which therefore are no more when the cleare flame reacheth its Element. But other men think otherwise, and they doe pitch *all in the affections*, and the meaner light in the understanding; and so turning the table, still one shall

Affection  
handmaid  
to Know-  
ledge ac-  
cording to  
some.

be

Knowledg  
a step to  
Affection,  
according  
to others.  
Knowledg  
& affecti-  
on names  
of differ-  
ent de-  
grees in  
the same  
nature.

Affection  
perfection  
of Know-  
ledge.

be a parcell of, or a step to the other, and each carry along *both* in equall measure according to reality: how much true affection, so much knowledge, & *vice versa*: as I shall shew in other two answers, on which I fixe the strength of my thoughts in this point. And therefore

Secondly, I affirme confidently, and, I hope, truly, that he, who soars upon the wings of *Affection*, and layeth himselfe in the arms of Jesus Christ, though hee amuse not his head with the mysticall nature of the Trinity, with the procession of the Spirit, with the *incarnation* of Jesus Christ, attempting to make that holy oyle; Touching the Ark,



Arke, this glory which is too high for him; loosing himselfe, while he laboreth to see how *humane* nature can be raised so high; *di-vine* condescend so low, as to bring forth the Hypostaticall Union: I say, such a one knoweth more of God, than the other.

It is often seene, a working head is like an over-hot liver, burneth up the heart, and so ruinerh both: Whereas sweet humble affections, are the onely way to keepe the poore creature in a constancy of spirituall health. And in this care the Apostle to *Titus* forbids *foolish questions, endlesse genealogies, contentions, and brawlings about the Law.*

This *Law* is the rule of  
life

Know-  
ledge of-  
ten no  
Know-  
ledge, but  
a vaine  
swelling.

Tit. 3.6.

Knowledg  
without  
power, e-  
ven in the  
law for-  
bidden.

Ceremo-  
niall law  
included  
in the Mo-  
rall.

Mar. 5. 28.

Mar. 7. 29.

life; and if we know not the *Law*, we cannot keepe the *Law*, and so we must perish; and yet we finde the search of this forbidden.

*Object.* Some will say, here is meant the Ceremoniall Law.

*Ans.* I will allow it; but is not the Ceremoniall included under the second precept? The people upon Christ his Sermon, wherein he taught, that *He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her in his heart* (and so he gave the Law its full latitude) say, *He speaketh as one that hath authority, and not as the Scribes and Pharises*: conceiving it their duty and happinesse to know the Law

Law in its utmost limits ;  
and yet we are restrained  
from any brain-sick, heady,  
nice inquiry, even into the  
Law, *scil.* not to busie our  
heads with the knowing  
part, in over-great pro-  
portion, but labour to  
bring our knowledge to  
practise.

If then all such know-  
ledge (I meane all know-  
ledge of this nature ) bee  
forbidden, it is because  
it is not good; it is not  
knowledge, but a vaine  
tumour in stead of reall  
greatnesse or growth: and  
that other of the affecti-  
on, hath certainly more of  
God in it, and so more of  
truth.

The Apostle is so great  
an enemy to this kinde of  
know-

V  
1 Cor. II.  
16.

knowledge, that having disputed such a point in disdain of gain-sayers, he concludeth, *If any man lust to be contentious, we have no such custome, nor the Churches of God.*

Cant. 2. 1.

*—Demonstrat qualibet herba Deum.* He who refreshed with the sweet odours, pleased with the various comely shapes of a flower, can say, this is sweet, this is lovely, lovely indeed; Yet *Iesus Christ is a bed of spices, as the Lilly of the field, the Rose of Sharon, sweeter, much sweeter, ten thousand times more lovely.* This man knoweth God, this man loveth God, this man knoweth him indeed; and this knowledge, as it is the most pleasant here, so it will certainly

tainly prove the most profitable hereafter, and alwayes declare it selfe most reall.

Doth not the Apostle, doth not he most truly, most pathetically cry out; *Though I had the gift of prophesie, and knew all secrets, all knowledge, yea, if I had all faith, so that I could remove mountaines, I were nothing; I were as sounding brasse and a tinckling Cymbal, if I have not charity.* When all these excellencies meet in a Christian, as happily they may, yet it is charity that maketh him what he is, and the other *Beings* are but as *Phalerae*, as trappings which give a handsome set-off, but not a Being to a Christian.

Love is lovely in Gods eye,

2 Cor. 13. 2.

God, from  
whom all  
light com-  
meth, is  
fill'd Love  
1 Ioh 4 16.

Women  
in greatest  
number  
truly gra-  
cious, be-  
cause most  
affection-  
ate.

eye, he is stiled the God of Love, the *God Love*. And in another place, the Scripture affirmeth that in this we have fulfilled the will of God, if we *love* one another; for by this we are made one with God, and so dwell in true light.

The two Tables are reduced to *Love* of God and our neighbour. So that sweet affections doe make the most sweet harmony in Gods cares. Of the Chorus of Saints, the greatest number will bee found amongst the feminine sexe, because these are most naturally capable of affection, and so most apt to make knowledge reall. It is true, I confesse, these affections misguided, led them first  
into

into transgression; but these same affections after, carried them first to the grave, then to the sight of a Saviour, gave them the enwombing of Christ, who (in some sense) might have entertained our nature in another way (if he had so pleased;) and these affections will one day raise many of them into the sweet embraces of everlasting joy.

Amongst the Church-Officers, the Pastor and the Doctor, according to *Timothie*, are more eminent than the rest, because *they labour in the word and doctrine*. Of these two, the Doctor is alwayes to have his sword alwayes girt about his thigh, he must enter into the lists with every uncircumcised

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1 Tim. 5. 17

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circumcised *Goliath*. Hee must stand continuall sentinell, that no heresies be forced upon the Church. He must beat his braines in dissolving *difficilia*, and clearing *obscura*. He must sometimes faint away in watery cold fits, by picking up, and throwing out witlesse, saplesse sophismes, which though they cannot hurt the strong, may seduce the weake. In the meane time, the Pastor leadeth the flock into the sweet and pleasant meadowes, feeding them by the little brooks of seemingly shallow affections; and yet this man shall not onely receive equall honour with the Doctor, but be preferred before him; as appeareth clearly in *Eph. 4. 11.*

*I Cor.*

✓  
The Pastor preferred before the Teacher, because the truth of truth in the heart lieth in the affection.



1 Cor. 12. 26. As it was with the Israelites, so it is here ; those who keepe the stuffe, receive equall reward with the combatants. I doe therefore conclude, Hee who hath the largest affections, hath most of God, most of his image, which is renewed in knowledge.

Thirdly, sometimes it hapneth, that those who have the largest knowledge, have the most enlarged affections, even to our eye ; and this is happinesse indeed. I confesse, it doth not so seeme to an eye that would read it running ; but if it be exactly looked on, if it be presented to our view in the portrait of an example, I thinke it will be very cleare.

*David*

Know-  
ledge,  
where it  
is eminent  
in truth as  
well as ap-  
pearance,  
there affe-  
ction is e-  
qually e-  
minent.

*David and  
Salomon  
compared  
with Paul.*

*David and Salomon* compared with *Paul*, will be as a thousand witnesses. The two first doe seeme to outstrip all men in affection, they are brim-full, running over.

For; *David* is stiled the sweet Singer of Israel; in his Psalmes he is ever magnifying the rich mercies of God, singing forth the praises of God, chusing rather to be a doore-keeper in the house of God, than to dwell in the tents of *Mesech*: making his Word to be a light unto his feet, and a lanthorn unto his paths, placing all his delight in the Law of the Lord.

*Salomon* is the happy Penman of that Hymne, which by the Spirit is stiled the  
Song

Song of Songs. Yet for all this, even in this, they are both exceeded by Saint *Paul*.

But some, it may be, will imagine those Worthies to be endowed with higher gifts of Nature and Art, than *S. Paul*: and then they will give all the glory to *their understanding*, and not to *their affections*.

If it be so, I confesse I have not fitly chosen my Opposites; But the truth will then appeare in Them, without comparison distinctly.

For, if in affection they exceed all, and in abilities are as *Saul*, taller than their brethren by head and shoulders, then is it manifest in them, that erstwhile men of

E the

the most raised parts, of highest abilities, doe superabound in love.

But, if, in things which are not directly of Faith, I could cease to be a Sceptique, I should with that most Reverend Worthy, *Thomas Goodwin*, give Saint *Paul* for head and heart, that Throne in heaven which is placed next to Jesus Christ. But *secret things belong to God*; let us onely compare their eminency here below. I think it will be out of question, that Saint *Paul* was the most excellent. For, though *Salomen* (there I suppose will be the difficulty) be said to be the wisest of men, that ever were, that ever should be; yet that is to be applied onely to Go-

vern

vernment, and (if it may reach so farre) to his excellent skill in naturall Philosophy.

View but Saint *Paul*, and see whether he doth not excell in every thing. He had gathered up vast learning at the feet of *Gamaliel*; for his parts he was advanced to eminent power in Church and Common-wealth. He saith of himselfe, *I profited in the Jewes religion above many my equalls in my owne nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers.* And after his conversion, he was judged the only man fit to contend with the Philosophers at Athens. For they who seemed to be somewhat, in conference added nothing

*Solomon*  
preemi-  
nence in  
knowledg  
extended  
to Poli-  
ticks, and  
naturall  
Philoso-  
phy only.

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to him. And therefore to  
 him was committed the un-  
 ravelling of all the difficult  
 knots. It is he that disputes  
 about meates, long haire,  
 divorces, irregular partings  
 of husband and wife. It is  
 he that openeth the nature  
 of propheticie, evinceth the  
 resurrection from the dead,  
 maintaineth justification by  
 faith. And that he may be  
 perfect in knowledge, God  
 is pleased (whether in the  
 flesh or spirit, he knoweth  
 not) to take him into the  
 third heavens: and there he  
 was so filled with Revelati-  
 on, that God was forced to  
 put the *Philomela*-Thorne  
 under his breast, that hee  
 might not fall into the sleep  
 of sin, and so give himsele  
 up (as *Sampson*) into the  
 hands

2 Cor. 12.3

hands of Philistine enemies. And yet this man exceeds all men in affections, and in his affections surpasseth all his other excellencies. It is hee that is often in journies, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by his owne nation, in perils amongst the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils amongst false Brethren, in wearinesse and painfulnesse, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold & nakednesse. And as he saith of himselfe, *who was weak and I was not weak & who was offended and I did not burne &* It is hee that fought with the beasts at Ephesus. He

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2 Cor. 11.  
26.

✓

is content not onely to  
bee bound, but to die for  
Christ.

V Good Saint *Paul* was so  
tender over his kinsmen ac-  
cording to the flesh, that  
for their sakes he could wil-  
lingly be content to be se-  
parated from the love of the  
Lord Jesus Christ. And  
this is greater love than that  
which Christ mentioneth;  
for no man had then shew-  
ed greater love than to die;  
but this holy Saint will goe  
one step further, he will suf-  
fer an eternall death for his  
friend.

V Thus, if suffering either  
for the head, or members,  
for the Church, or Christ,  
will discover affection, I  
suppose hee will merit the  
Garland.

And



And as a complement and crowne of all, if to live be most for Gods glory, though death be his advantage, he is resolved to submit, making obedience to Christ in life and death, his gaine and triumph.

I confesse, when he travelleth through those brierly disputes, he cannot display such sparkling vivid affections: But when hee hath gotten but a little above those lime-twigs, how doth he mount on high, and there, upon even wings, disdaine all things below, triumphing in the imbraces of his Saviour, who is to him more choice than the choicest of ten thousand?

If what I have attempted to prove, be true, as I hope

True  
knowledg,  
true affe-  
ction, se-  
parated  
from all  
appearan-  
ces or out-  
ward ad-  
vantages  
of the bo-  
dy, or the  
like, are  
one.

it is, then Consider,

Either those who are e-  
minent in affection, and o-  
therwise know little; or  
those who, as they abound  
in one, are also Masters in  
the other: Distinguish ap-  
pearances from truth; Rea-  
ding, memory, discourses,  
effects of sense or com-  
plexion, from that which  
entreteth the soule, becom-  
meth reall there, acteth,  
floweth from thence as a  
spring: And then will you  
conclude, that all knowledg  
lieth in the affection; that  
all knowledge is but one,  
differing onely in degrees.

And lastly, that all, whe-  
ther knowledge or affecti-  
on, is but the *Truth*, that spi-  
rituall ray of heavenly  
light which God is pleased  
to

to present to our view under severall shapes, yet is but one and the same Being, *scil. light and truth.*

CHAP. X.

*That all the severall and particular actions of the soule, are this one light and truth.*

**T**HUS have I dispatched the first discourse of the generall form and nature of the Understanding. Now concerning the particular and various workings thereof, in conclusions, simple apprehensions, negations and affirmations, &c. which seeme to be the offspring of the first and originall

Apprehensions, conclusions, affirmations, &c. all one truth in the soule.

ginal Being; even these, I hope to prove all one and the same, as with themselves, so with the former, all conjoynd in one Being of *light* and *truth*. That is truth in the fountaine, *this* in the streames; and no man will deny the fountaine and streame to make one river. Onely, sometimes it appeareth in such a shape, sometimes in another, but is still the same soule.

The operations of the soule are proved one with the essence thereof.

This will appeare if wee compare the nature of the Soule or Understanding (for we have proved them both one) with their irradiations, actings and severall emanations. *Res enim dignoscenda sunt ex causis.* Now, we conceive the first Being to be no other thing, than

than *activity*, so confest by all. And if you would know what an *activity* is, you shall finde it to be either *potentia agendi*, or *ipsa actio*, or rather *actus primus* & *actus secundus*.

If it be *actus*, either *Primus* or *Secundus* (for *primus* and *secundus* are to me differenc'd onely by time, and so not differenc'd at all, (of which I will presently speak a little more) it must be still in work, and is no longer than it acts. Now, what can this act be in this subject, whereof we discourse, but the reasonable working of the soule in this or that conclusion? If it be any other than a work of reason, how can it constitute, or become the forme of a rati-  
onall soule and humane un-  
derstand-

derstanding? If it be such, how differs it from thought, ratiocination or positions in the minde?

The acti-  
vity which  
is the form  
of the soul,  
not differ-  
ent from  
the actions  
thereof. ✓

Whilst then these conclusions, sayings, actions, are the forme of that truth, of that universall first truth, they must be that truth. For, *forma quæ dat esse, est esse*, and whatsoever is the forme of any thing, that is the Being of it. For, Being and Forme are but one.

If the forme of this activity be not these reasonable workings, it must be something either of a baser alloy, or of a higher stamp.

Not of a  
higher  
straine. ✓

If the latter; then you speak of Angels, or some other spiritual Being, if there be any which is more noble than the soule. And then  
how

how doth this excellency discover it selfe? Where or what is it? How is it said that Action is the perfection of all things?

If the former; then *first* you descend to some lower degree of existency; for, all Being is but an activity; and according to the glory or baseness of that activity, doth the Being receive denomination.

Nor of a lower.

Or *secondly*; Shall the cause be more ignoble than the effects? What then? If it be neither more excellent, nor lower, is it various, hath it lesse or more of action? still you fall at the same stone.

Neither can it be various.

But they who approve of the distinction of *actus primus* and *actus secundus*, think they

they save all by the distinction of substance and accident ; So, with them, *actus primus* is the Being, the substance it selfe : and *actus secundus* is the product of that Being or accident belonging to that which they make a soule ; and thus forgetting this, that *omnis virtus consistit in actione*, they make the soule a meere virtuall Being.

The distinction between *actus primus* and *actus secundus*, examined.

But, besides that the former Reasons are not thus everted, of these men I should ask this question.

What is this their *actus primus* ? What is the forme of it ? What is with them the forme of a reasonable soule ?

Is not Reason ? can there then be a soule, till there be reason ?



reason? And this Reason is not *potentia ratiocinandi*, but *Ratio*. For, if you distinguish between the act and power, the act must ever be first in order, dignity, and nature.

So then, What is the form of this *primus actus*? is not some act? if it be, it must exist; else you will allow it but a bare notionall Being, which lyeth in the apprehension. And if it doth exist, must it not be this which you call *actus secundus*?

If it be not an act, they make it nothing but a power, a faculty depending upon something else. And if this be the nature of the first, what can the second Being (which is the effect, and so lower)

The distinction  
between  
Substance  
and Acci-  
dent cal-  
led into  
question.

lower) be, but a bare no-  
tion?

If here were fit place, I  
might perhaps set upon the  
Rack that long-famous Di-  
stinction of *Substance* and  
*Accident*, wherby It should  
be forced to confesse it selfe  
an aged imposture, at least  
in the generall and frequent  
acceptance.

But the activity consisting  
in the action, That and It  
shall both be proved but  
one; and so, *actus primus* and  
*actus secundus* are this same  
*truth*, this light which I  
plead for.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

*An objection answered, in  
which the nature of Time  
and Place are touched.*

**Y**ET this doth exceedingly stumble mens thoughts; wee see various actings of the soule, distinguished by the circumstances of Time and Place; there are severall distinct actings; are there then so many severall soules?

First, I could justly give this answer; When these men can tell me what *time* and *place* is, I doe hope I shall finde both time and place to dissolve the difficulties.

Second-

Secondly, I shall, I suppose, both by reason and their owne assertions in the like case, prove that *time* and *place* are nothing, or alter nothing in this point; and that, these *simile's* will a little irradiate.

The nature of  
Beauty illustrating  
time and  
place.

Beauty (if I bring not the exact discription of the learned, yet I shall remember so much as concerneth the point in hand) consists in complexion, in lineaments, and in harmony.

Complexion draweth his Being from colour, from the subject wherein colour is seated, the spirits which give a Being to this colour, &c. and these are differenced by many circumstances. Lineaments as they are adorned by, so are they the  
orna-

ornaments of this complexion. And these againe are diuers from themselves, and diuers from Harmony. And yet, by Harmony, these make up one sweet, one pleasant Being, which we call Beauty.

A Flame rising from diuers thornes, is not many, is but one flame. A streame filled with various springs, is not various, is but one streame. So is it in our case.

Those Circumstances of time and place, differencing these various Beings, are something, or nothing.

If nothing, the objection is answered.

If something, they are a piece of the whole, they serve to make up that harmony,

Time and  
Place no-  
thing diffe-  
rent from  
the essence  
of the soul.

mony, which we call Beauty, *καλότης*. Thus time and place, with all Beings of the like nature, are either nothing, or else they have a share in the Being, and make up the *totum Compositum*.

The Soule is but one Act distinguished to our notion by severall apparitions; and these intervals, with all variations, either are nothing, or are of the nature of the Soule, and serve to make up that consort, that truth, that life that we now discourse of.

And that this is so, I hope by this cleere ratiocination to leave you assured.

Time and Place seeme to me nothing but an extrinse-call modification of a thing. I cannot finde that the learned

ned have made any thing at all of them. Let us survey them, as they define them, when they treat of them; as they esteeme them, when they meete them occasionally.

How hath *Aristotle* defined Place? *Est superficies concava corporis ambientis*; Where is the truth of this in the highest heaven which incompasseth all the rest? Hath *Ramus* any whit advanced the cause in his definition? *Est subjectum rei locatae*; *Idem per Idem*! Are not those who propound, and they who entertain such a definition, justly compared to the Constable and the Country-Justice? The first having received from some higher power a War-

The definitions of time and place rejected.

Place.

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•

rant, wherein was this hard  
 word, *Invasion*, repaired to  
 his Rabbi for Solution:  
 he, that the question might  
 seeme somewhat obscure,  
 paused a little, that it might  
 not shame him; after he had  
 consulted, in a stroke or two  
 with his grave-learned beard,  
 replied; the sense of this  
 word is very plaine, it is  
*Invasion*, it signifieth *Inva-*  
*sion*; with which the Con-  
 stable being fully satisfied,  
 gave him many thanks and  
 departed. *Locus* and *spatium*  
*corporis locati*, is little better;  
 what have we in this defini-  
 tion, of the intrinsecall na-  
 ture of place? So that, if I  
 be not wholly blinde, they,  
 whilst they treat of it as  
 Scholars, make it nothing:  
 when they make use of it by  
 the



the By, it is the same. As, the Soule, they say, is *tota in toto*, and *tota in qualibet parte*; whilst they spread and diffuse the soule over the whole body, from one extremity to the other, Place maketh no division in the soule; it is but one soule, yet extended quite through the body. Angels are *definitive in loco*; that place which is within the circumference so limited, doth not at all cause them to make two in this angelicall Being.

I may affirme the same of time, *Tempus est mensura motus*; What doe I know of time by this? how can I from hence ghesse time to have so considerable a Being, as that it shall make two of that which otherwise

Tibae.

wife would be but one? In the Deity we are sure it can have no such effect. In the Deity wee have creation, preservation, redemption, decree, and execution of that decree. All these to our apprehension are distinguished by time: and yet no man will say, that in God they are two: for God is *purus actus, nulla potentia.*

But you will say, this is *obscurum per obscurius*, and not to unmask and unveil difficulties: Which no *Simile* taken from the Divinity can doe, because That is all mysticall.

To which I answer, *Si magnis licet componere parva*, wee shall finde the same in our selves, we shall find that  
Time

Time doth not at all difference, or any way act. I suppose it is cleare, that Place hath lost all place and credit in this argumentation. Why may not I say the same of Time, seeing by all mens confessions they are twins of the same womb? But secondly, I affirme this, (and I hope truly) that if you make Time any thing, you annihilate all the act of the Creation; that is, you will admit of no one perfect action. A thought, I confesse, passeth in a moment; and yet, in this moment, under this moment, are many subdivisions of Time. We have in an houre, an halfe, a quarter, a minute, a second, (the 60 part of a minute:) & how many subdivisions will

All actions  
nothing,  
if time be  
any thing.

a scruple admit of? For ought I know. Time and *punctum Physicum* agree in this, that they are *divisibilia in infinitum*. If then you will make so many thoughts in a thought, as you have divisions under a scruple, you will have no perfect thought, no compleat act. To shun this, you wil confesse that Time doth not divide one act alone: but one Act or thought comprehendeth many Times. Why may not I say, that if Time doth not parcell our one act, it cannot act upon two, when the duality ariseth onely from Time? This not being well weighed, hath cast our wits upon strange rocks, hath raised this Question,

*How*

*How doth God see things?*

If in their existencies, then all things are co-eternall with God: if in their Causes onely, then all things are not present with God; but you must admit of succession, a former and a latter, to eye divine; which is blasphemy. This dilemma seemeth strong; but it is because we make Time something: whereas indeed all things did exist in their Beings with God *ab omni eterno*. For, *eternum* & *tempus* are all one in eternity: and this succession is but to our apprehension.

Thus, if Time and Place be nothing, I hope the weight of this objection is taken off.

The difficulty untied, how God seeth things.

But I foresee another objection.

*Object.* If Time and Place be nothing, if all our Actions are but One: How can there be evill and good?

*Answ.* I fully conclude with *Aristotles Adversaries Anaxagoras, Democritus, &c* That Contradictions may be *simul & semel* in the same Subject, same Instant, same Notion (not onely in two distinct respects, or notions, as one thing may be *causa & effectum*, *Pater & Filius*, *respectu diversi*; but even in the same respect, under one and the same Notion.) For, *Non ens* is nothing; and so, the Being which it hath, may subsist with that which contradicts it. I speake in their termes.

Now

Now, let us view our actions, either

as { Many, in pieces, or,  
} One entire act.

As many; impute Transgression to what you please, either to the effects in the body, or the Will, and its workings: all these, so farre as they have Being, are good; for, all Being is good. Where then is the sinne? Certainly, sinne lieth in this, that there is not so full a goodnesse as there should. Sin is onely a Privation, a Non-Entity: But, a Privation, a Non-Entity may subsist (according to the subsistence it hath) with Being. Such a co-existence of Entity and Non-Entity, was in his faith, who cried, *Lord, I beleeeve, help my un-*

*liefe.* This Contradiction (of Entiry, Non-Entiry) must be in the selfe-same Act, (and not in two distinct Acts: ) else the Act is perfect, (having complete Entiry, goodnesse, without admixture of Non-Entiry :) and so is onely the Creator: or else it is more imperfect than *Beelzebub*; for, It is Bad, and no Good, Non-Entiry wholly, and no Entiry, and so no Action.

Thus we see Good and Evill may co-exist in severall, in particular Actions; Why then *not* so, if all Acts should bee but one entire Act, undistinguish'd by Time or Place? If the members composing the Body, have matter and forme, why then  
not



not the whole Body & Sinne  
in it selfe is *nothing*, only a  
*non-conformity* to Gods Law.

The Twilight hath not  
*so much* light and *so much*  
positive darknesse: only it  
hath not *so much* light as  
Noon in cleare day. Here's  
the defect: and by this de-  
fect, Light and Darknesse  
co-exist in the same point  
of ayre.

So, though our AAs bee  
but one, undivided by Time  
and Place: yet, to our grieve,  
are not free from Sinne.

Thus the Soule, Truth,  
Light, is alwayes and con-  
tinually one, though it ap-  
peareth otherwise to me:  
and this appearance ought  
not to dazle the sight of  
the truth; for, as they say  
of honour, *Honor est in ho-*

norante: so may I say of apprehension, *Apprehensio est in apprehendente*: the thing is still the same, let my apprehension bee what it will bee.

The same truth taking various shapes in our apprehensions.

I doe not reject the phrases of severall truths, and severall actings of this truth: for, *Loquendum cum vulgo*; yet, phrases must not mislead us. For whilst I confesse *loquendum esse cum vulgo*, I professe that *sapiendum est cum paucis*. For, to our apprehension, that truth which is but one, doth variegate it selfe, and take divers shapes.

Set forth by a similitude taken from the Sun.

As that Sun which is one and the same, is ruddy in the morning, cleere at noone-day; of a moderate heate early, and at mid-day rather torrid.

Various

Various colours meeting in the same point, to make up one indivisible act of sense, are by it judged divers Beings, whereas they all make up but one Being; they are but one and the same object of sense. Reason, which is exalted above Sense, telleth us it must be so; because that act of life is but one, and the Sense is not an Ubiquitary; it cannot act upon any more than one at once.

The Trigonall Glasse paints out to us *more*, and *more lively* colours in every object (which as a *medium* it presents to the eye) *than* are in the Iris; yet, This object, may be but some duskyish sad thing, in which there is no change of colours at all.

The same act of sense perfectly one, yet varied unto many formes.

A Similitude from the trigonall glasse.

Sense con-  
futed by  
Copernicus.

The three leading Senses have confuted Copernicus these many yeares; for the eye seeth the circularions of the Heavens; we feele our selves upon a stable and firme foundation; and our eares heare not from the volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth: and yet now if we will beleeve our \* new Masters, sense hath done as sense will doe, misguided our Reason.

\* Copernic.  
Kepler. Ga-  
lileus de  
Galil:

When the nimble juglers play their pranks, you see and heare, yet neither see nor heare. So your sense is no good judge. Thus let the soule be raised to its supreme height of power, and it will cleereley see, that all

all the actings of reason which seeme severall (bee they, as we think, distinguished by time and place) are but one, a fixt entire unity.

CHAP. XII.

*Another objection is answered, drawn from the falshood in the workings of the soule.*

**B**Ut if these particular actings of truth, are truth; then when this Being, which wee have so long discoursed of, acteth not truth, it ceaseth to bee: and so, where the soule entertaineth or pronounceth a false position, the soule is no more it selfe.

*Object.*

Grant

Successi-  
on of mo-  
ments, ap-  
parent, not  
reall.

The soule  
never acts  
falsly.

Grant that it is with the soule in this moment of time, when it acts upon falsehood, as when it acts not, and so is not; yet you will advance nothing, till you can prove the succession of moments to have a reall being. By former discourse, I hope it is cleare, that Time is but a Nominall Being, and then this cessation depending on that distinct moment, which is not, is likewise it selfe an imagination.

But secondly, I will allow it, when any man can shew me that Falshood is a reall being, which the soule or truth can worke upon; For, in every apprehension two things are to be weighed; The Agent it selfe, and the Subject acted upon, ( I  
speake

speake now in other mens language ; for I conceive the Agent together with the Subject to be One in the act.) Truth is alwayes truth, *Nemine dubitante* ; and so it must be true, whilst it acteth on a truth. If that be True, which it act upon, then all is well ; if it be False, it is a vanity, a lye, a nothing. For, if Falshood have a Being, then wee must either with the Manichees, make Two sources of Being, or else God must be the author of it ; which no man will affirme.

If then it have no Being, the Soule cannot act in it, and so it cannot be the act of the Soule ; For, how shall the soule or truth act upon nothing ?

But

*Object.*

*Resp.*  
In false  
propositi-  
ons of the  
soule, so  
farre as it  
acts, it acts  
truly :  
where it  
is decei-  
ved, it is  
by not  
acting.

But the Soule doth act,  
when it pronounceth a false  
position?

✓ He that in the twilight,  
mistaketh a man for a tree,  
acteth right in what he see-  
eth; and when he raiseth a  
false conclusion upon the  
premisses, he acteth not.  
For, how is it possible, that  
a man should act falshood,  
a vanity, nothing?

In this action, there are  
two things; There is the see-  
ing a Being, and the seeing  
it under a confused notion.  
Or, which is the same,

You may observe, first, the  
opining; secondly, the opi-  
ning uncertainly or falsely.

✓ The opining, is a good  
act, none will deny; to think,  
let it be what it will be,  
is good.

But



But secondly, the so-thinking, is that which is obscure. Now certainly, the *formalis ratio* of this so-thinking, lyeth in thinking of error, which is nothing; and in thinking of nothing, the the soule cannot act; for, nothing produceth nothing.

A man, who catcheth at the shadow of a Hornet, acteth rightly in catching, and stingeth not himselfe; because he apprehenderh onely the shadow; because so far he doth not act; for to catch a shadow, to catch nothing, and not to act, are *idem*. And thus, whilst the soule catcheth at a false position, it graspeth but the shadow, which can be nothing, seeing evill is nothing.

Paine hath  
no recall  
Being.

thing; *ergo*, it loseth not truth; for it pronounceth nothing but the truth of the position.

The same may be said for *Paine*. I conceive, it cannot act upon the soule, nor the soule upon it, because it is but a bare privation of spirit and strength. And upon this ground, I shall subscribe to that opinion propounded by that reverend, worthy, that quick-sighted Balearian-jaculator, M<sup>r</sup> D<sup>r</sup> *Twisse*: Whether it be not better to be in perpetuall paine, than not to be at all. If *Paine* be but a bare privation, certainly Any Being is more desirable, than, for feare of a privation (a not-being) to become *no-Being*.

*Hic*

*Hic rogo, non furor est, ne moriari, mari?* If any man shall tell me I speak against sense, I shall modestly ask him this Question: Whether it be not *impar congressus* betwixt Sense and Reason: and whether, in that case, Sense be an equall judge. Reason telleth us, that *Paine* must either be something, or nothing; if *nothing*, then it is but a privation; if *something*, it must be either good, or evill; if *good*, it cannot (as hath, and will yet appeare more in this Pamphlet) hurt us; if *evill*, it is either a *nominnall* evill, or *reall*; if it be named an evill, and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a *Reall* evill, then it is nothing; for, *Evill*, by consent

*Mart. lib. 2.  
Epigr. 80.*

sent of all, is nothing but privation of good. In this case shall Reason or Sense guide, judge You.

### CHAP. XIII.

*Discovering the consequences of this Position, that All things are one Truth.*

S I R,



**W**HEN you collect your thoughts, and passe sentence upon these unsheaved gleanings, your gentlenes (though the papers merit no such favour) will smile upon them; and say, here our eyes indeed are pleased with the curiosity of *Pallas* her needle: but, what hath *Reason* to work upon?

upon? what is the usefulness of this more than *Arachne's* web? more than to entangle empty wits withall? What fruit doth it yeeld better than the Silkworme, which is worne onely for ostentation? Give me leave to plead for my own. Our own (you know, though black) is comely to Our selves.

If This were well weighed, that all things are but one emanation from power divine: If this were taken fully into the Understanding, that wee might be said to live upon, to live in this truth; we should live more Christianly, more cheerfully.

*Non est vivere, sed valere,  
vita.*

The happiness of our lives advanced by this opinion.

*Mart. li. 6.  
Ep. 70.*

I say more cheerfully, more Christianly, in a few moments, than we doe now in the whole course of our distracted time. And you will more easily consent to this, if you doe consider that our happinesse is compounded of two Simples only, which are so entertwined, as that they may seeme One,

The first is to *know*.

✓ The second, to *doe* what is right and good.

Of the former, the Theoreticall part, I shall speake hereafter. In the Practick, Two things are considerable.

*First*, that, Action dependeth wholly upon knowledge. And, of Knowledge, this is the well-spring and rule, that, *Vnity is all*. The Spirit

This Vnity  
the fountaine of  
knowledg.

✓

Spirit saith, *How can you love whom you doe not know?* and I may say, *How can you do what you know not?*

The Not-knowledge of of what is right, withholdeth from, and wearieth in action; if perchance wee ever have any glimmering of light. For, *Ignorance* bringeth this *double* evill with it.

Action  
wholly depends on  
knowledg.

First, it leadeth into Error; and Error (simply in the view of it) giveth no content.

Secondly, in the progresse it wearieth and distracteth. One who is lost in a Wood, suffereth as much in seeking as losing the way. Whereas, if we Knew aright, how even and smooth would be the way of action, and how great

great our contents therein?

*Secondly*, not only all our actions turn upon this hinge; but out of this treasury issueth forth the whole complacency that wee gather from, or receive in action. For, if wee know this truth, that all things are *one*; how cheerfully, with what modest courage should wee undertake any action, re-incounter any occurrence, knowing that that distinction of misery and happinesse, which now so perplexeth us, hath no Being, except in the Brain? Wee should not need to check and raise our selves with *Dauids* out-cryes, *why art thou cast downe my soule, why art thou disquieted within me?* Our Spirits could



could with him wait upon  
God; make him our only  
rock, and then wee should  
not be moved. We should  
not call for *Epicetus* nor  
*Boetius de consolatione Phi-*  
*losophicâ*; wee might fetch  
our cures from our own bo-  
somes, if from this one  
truth of unity wee could  
conclude these two things.

First, that Misery is no-  
thing, and so cannot hurt.

Secondly, that every  
thing that is, is good, and  
good to me: then we might  
sing with a joyfull spirit,  
*O nimium, nimiumque beati*;  
and upon sure ground; for,  
whilst I being a Being, am  
Good, and that other Being  
is Good, and these Two  
Goods can fall under no  
other difference, but of de-  
grees,

grees; Good & Good, cannot but agree, and so must be good to me.

Ob.

If any man shall say, that the overflowing of another mans good, may be my evil; they mis-take; for, such a thought is a falshood; and, as I have already proved, Falshood is nothing, and so cannot hurt.

Rsp.

That such a thought is falshood, I suppose this will cleare it.

The Philosophers fancy to themselves *animam mundi*, and say every parcell is as a Simple contributing to the existence of that *Compositum*. But Christians know, and I have (if I mistake not) evinced, that, all Being is *but one emanation from above*, diversified onely in our appreh-

prehension. How can then one piece of that Being impeach the other, one part of the Soule quarrell with the other? As the *Will* (speaking in their termes) with the *sensitive faculty*; or the *Eye* with the *Belly*: the vanity whereof *Esoy* hath taught us long agoe. So, of necessity, if either my *envy*, or anothers *folly*, lay me low, because my brother is exalted, this must be a lie; and so cannot hurt. *E contrario*, the Good of another being the perfection of the whole, is my advantage. If with this eye you view that Scripture, you will see it in its glory, *Is thine eye evill, because thy brothers good increaseth?*

The rule, you see is, that I should rejoyce at the well-

G

fare

All things  
one piece.

Mat. 20. 15

Propriety  
maketh  
lovely.

fare of another. Now what is the reason of the rule? Philosophy teacheth us, that it is not onely *admirabile*, but *id est*, that is, lovely. If then I must rejoyce, I rejoyce because of some propriety, and this propriety ariseth from *Unity*; this Alkermes of Unity, cheereth the drooping spirit, cureth the *atrabilis* of Melancholy. The same potion easeth the heart of envying, censurings and whisperings. So he, who knoweth that injuries, because they are nothing, cannot hurt; and good things, though anothers, doe serve him; cannot cherish such viperous starvelings in his thoughts.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

*The benefit which Knowledge  
and all Sciences receive from  
this assertion.*

**H**ave in a word  
showne how Uni-  
ty untyeth all dif-  
ficulties, unites all happi-  
nesse in *practicall* things.  
Permit me to discover what  
influence it hath upon that  
other simple, which maketh  
up the compound of our  
happinesse, (*scil.*) *Theorie*.

Tully saith of Epicurus,  
*Frangit, non dividit*; The  
breaking of learning into  
so many Sciences, is but  
making so many miles,  
that so the Master may  
have more hire for his post-

G 2      horse.

The vani-  
ty of di-  
viding  
knowledg  
into many  
Sciences.

horse. They forget, that, *vita est brevis*, whilst *ars est longa*. It were much better if all Learning were like the chaine fastned at *Iupiters* Throne, all of a piece: Or the Beame, which from the Sunne by a continuall tract of irradiation toucheth the treasures of the earth.

To the effecting of this, that learned, that mighty man *Comenius* doth happily and rationally indeavour to reduce *all* into *one*. Why doe wee make Philosophy and Divinity two Sciences? What is True Philosophy but Divinity? and if it be not True, it is not Philosophy.

Confusions from  
division in  
knowledg.

Doe but see a little in particulars, the fruit of such like divisions.

Ir

In the knowledge of Beings, we must observe

First, that, Being is :

Secondly, What it is.

There is the *ēti*, and the *quēti*. What a tedious work doth this very division lay upon us? Alas, the very first, the easiest part of it, will take up all our time; and to ascend to causes before we know that there are effects, is to mount the highest round, before we ascend the first. And therefore that learned wit, *Sir Francis Bacon*, in his naturall Philosophy, bringeth onely experiments, leaving the search of causes to those, who are content, with *Icarus*, to burne their wings at a fire too hot for them. Indeed, sometimes as an imbellish-

Knowledg  
double, of  
Beings, &  
of their  
Causes.

Knowledg  
of Beings  
twofold,  
of their  
existen-  
cies, and  
their na-  
tures.

ment of his discourse, that he may please stirring fancy, he interlaceth some causes, yet gently and modestly propoundeth them, but as for entertainment. If now our humble spirits could be content to see all things, as they are, but one, onely bearing different shapes, we should according to that rule, *Noli altum sapere*, improve in what we know, and there sit downe. But our spirits are mighty *Nimrods*, hunting after knowledge, venturing all, to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill. Which curiositie of ours, is wittily reproved by Sir Iohn Davies;

*Why did my Parents send  
me to the Schooles,  
That*



*That I with knowledg might  
enrich my minde :  
When the desire to know,  
first made men fooles.  
And did corrupt the root  
of all mankind.*

And for this reason we lose  
with *Esops* Dog, the sub-  
stance, and get not the sha-  
dow.

Causes we cannot, neither  
shall ever finde out : The  
knowledg of existencies we  
omit ; they are too volumi-  
nous, if we did attempt ; and  
so much doubted of by men,  
that what to think, we know  
not. View all Learning, and  
see how the very Being of  
things, is questioned in Na-  
turall Philosophy. Amongst  
the *Quadrupedes*, wee que-  
stion the existence of the

Knowledg  
of existen-  
cies need-  
fury, but  
alcogether  
uncertain.

Unicorne: *inter volatilia*,  
 the Phoenix, and the Bird of  
 Paradise: amongst *Pisces*,  
 the Mer-maid. When we  
 seek into *Minerals*, we finde  
 not *Ebur fossile*; the incom-  
 parable vertues of it wee  
 meet with in all Physicians:  
 but the subject of so many  
 excellencies, we doubtful-  
 ly hope for. Of *herbes* and  
*plants*, Bookes name many  
 which gardens, meadowes,  
 rivers afford not: If they  
 ever were, we may give them  
 to *Pancirolla*, that he may  
 reckon them with *perpetu-  
 um mobile*, the Philosophers  
 stone, *cum multis alijs*, *inter  
 Inventa perdita*: For every  
 age interreth old things,  
 and is againe fertile of new  
 births.

If we were mighty men,

as *Adam*, that all the creatures would come and present themselves to our view: yet (which is the second part of this first Question) wee could not give them their names according to their natures. For when we doe know that any Being doth exist, we doe not know what their formes, their severall qualities and temperaments are. We altogether are ignorant of herbes and plants; which are hot and cold, in how many degrees they are so. For in these, how many, how eternall are the debates? Some deny the healing vertue to *Dissanum*. Some question the nature of that killing-saving Indian herb, *Hen-man-bane*, *Tobacco*: whose insolence is

Knowledge  
of the na-  
tures more  
uncertain  
than the  
existen-  
cies.

such, as to make That part  
 of man a chimney, an outlet  
 of her smoky birth (expres-  
 sed happily by Doctor Tho-  
 ty in these words, *Inq, tuto*  
*genitas baurire & reddere*  
*nubes:*) I say, to make That  
 an outlet of her smoky birth,  
 by which the old Romans  
 (in this their Proverb, *Est*  
*homo nasutus*) discovered  
 their judgements of gifts  
 and wit. Some say it is hot,  
 and some say it is cold.  
 Few of the Learned, consent  
 about the degrees of heat  
 and cold in any Simple, and  
 so are forced to palliate all  
 with the gaudy mantle of  
*occulta qualitas*; Yet what  
 are all these but matter of  
 observation? manifest ef-  
 fects, which Sense teacheth  
 the plowman, the Country-  
 man,

man, yea the bruises themselves, as familiarly, as warmth in the Sun-shine, and wet in the Raine. I could name many questions in \* Politickes, Oeconomickes, Ethickes, &c. the very subject whereof are in dispute. But they will more happily fall in, when I discover our ignorance in causes.

\* As all those laws concerning slaves, whereas a slave indeed is *non ens*, for if any man have given

away, with Esau, his birth-right, yet he hath not lost it; because manhood and religion are *not mei juris*; they are talents which God hath intrusted me with, and are no more deputable, than places of judicature. *Ex fide ceteris.*

Thus you see in what a Maze you are Meandred, if you admit of any division. The very knowledge of the Being of things, is more than we are capable of. And as yet that is necessary,

In what sense Knowledge of Beings is to be wished.

sary, so we keepe our selves still to this principle, that those things are all of one nature, variegated only in our apprehension: and this knowledge I must consent to.

But if men once seeke into the *Causes* of Substencies, I see no reason but they should suffer as *Rei lesa Majestatis*. For these are *Arcana Imperii*, which to meddle with, is no lesse than high Treason.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

*Confusion in the knowledge  
of Causes, discovered, and  
redressed by this Vnity.*

**I**F wee are thus at a stand, in these very beginnings, what shall wee bee, when wee enquire after Causes? Two lie open to our view. *First*, our great and good God, the fountaine of all Being, and this the Ancients styled *Fatum*.

*Secondly*, there is that *Emanation* from him, which is the first created cause of all Being, and this was *Aristotle's materia prima*, so far as sensible things extend. Which

Two only causes received, God, and emanation from God.

*Aristotles materia prima brought to light.*

Which because it is the substance of all things, and the variations of it make all *formes*; therefore in it selfe, he described it to be neither *quid*, *quale*, nor *quantum*.

All other causes are better knowne by name, than in the natures of them. They make many, as *Efficient*, *Finall*, *Materiall*, *Formall*; with divers subdistinctions; as instrumentall, exemplary, &c. All these have matter and forme. For, there is a matter, and forme of a materiall cause, and forme and matter of formall causes. For in a table of wood, the materiall cause is not the matter, wood: wood is the subject, upon which this materiall cause bringerth forth that effect,  
a Table.

Matter &  
Forme  
have their  
matter and  
forme,  
both of  
which  
meet in  
the eman-  
nation.



a Table. It may bee the  
materiall cause shall not  
be Physicall matter; wee  
shall by and by finde it ano-  
ther name.

Of the forme of a mate-  
riall cause, I shall say no-  
thing, and so for formall  
causes.

Faith is said to be the  
forme of a Christian, and  
faith hath its forme. The  
soule is by many deemed  
(which I understand not)  
the forme of the reasonable  
creature, and it hath a par-  
ticular individuall forme.  
And thus both materiall  
and formall causes have  
matter and forme.

Matter againe, is either  
*Physicall* and substantiall, or  
metaphoricall and *metaphy-  
sicall*. And this is the name  
I pro-

I promised even now. The  
 Formes are either intrin-  
 secall, or extrinsecall: the  
 intrinsecall are Logically,  
 Metaphysicall, &c.

Now have you various  
 and severall kinds of formes;  
 but who knoweth the least  
 considerable part of matter  
 or forme? Who will not  
 cleerly lose himselfe in such  
 an inquest? May we not say  
 of these, what one saith  
 wittily of the Soule?

*For, Her true forme, how can  
 my sparke discern,  
 which dim by nature, Art  
 did never cleere:  
 When the great wits, of whom  
 all skill we learne,  
 Are ignorant, both what  
 she is, and where?*

Doe

Doe but survey the Physicall Beings of our Philosophers, with what impossible, with what unnecessary scrutinies of causes, do they weary themselves, and their Disciples?

The vaine  
search of  
causes in  
Physicks.

Till *numeri Platonici* cease to be a Proverb, I must remaine a Sceptrick, although one undertake to teach me, *how* and *whence* it is, that various rowlings of the tongue, shall send forth so many articulate voices, and so many severall languages.

Till it be known, how all numbers gather themselves into an Unity, I must not give credence to another, who promiseth an accompt of the estuation of the Sea.

I know some surrender  
*Neptunes Trident* to the  
Moone,

\*Platonici;  
who make  
the world  
animal ma-  
gnum Vide  
Gal. in Sy-  
stem. Pto-  
lem. & Co.  
pernic. Kep-  
lers Harmo.

Moone, and there fix the reason of *Thetis* her uncertain ebbings. Others \*give the world a good paite of lungs, and from these Bel- lowes expect the causes of what they inquire for. Others take a dish of water, and shaking it up and down, think to cleere this difficulty. But these their ratiocinations discover cleerly, that with *NOAH'S Dove*, through over-much water, they can finde no ground for footing. For *veritas non querit angulos*. And if the reason were ready, they would not have disputed; and yet they are very confident; and why may not they be so, who dare venture to give (before they prove any Orbs) the government of the

the Orbs to a band of celestiall intelligences?

I shall not wonder, if these men every where finde an *Euripus*, and at its bankes imitate their Grandy's\* out-cry, *Quia ego non possum te capere, tu me capias.*

How doth the Spirit be-foole these men? First hee telleth them, that they are so farre from finding out the Causes, that they are ignorant of the Effects: Knowest thou the time when the wild Goats of the rock bring forth? or canst thou mark when the Hindes doe calve? Canst thou number the moneths that they fulfill, or knowest thou the time when they bring forth?

Salomon saith, There are three things too wonderfull for

✓

Aristot.

Iob 39.1,2.

✓

•

Prov. 30.

18. 19.

for me; yea, foure which I know not. The way of an Eagle in the aire, the way of a serpent upon a rocke, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea, and the way of a man with a maid.

See Aristot.  
de mundo,  
de celo &c.

How doth our great Master perplexe himselfe in the inquiry of causes? Sometimes he makes the *principia* of naturall things, to be *contraria*: whereas, neither the heavens, nor the starres, nor any thing that is by univocall generation, is that way produced. Sometimes he allowes three *principia*, *Privatio*, *Materia*, & *Forma*; forgetting his own principle, that *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, not remembering that when hee hath matter and forme, he is yet to seek for the Rock and Pit, out of which

which matter and form are digged and hewed; and therefore instituteth two severall authors, one of matter, another of forme.

I confesse, his Commentators doe file of some rust from these Tenets, but not so cleerely as to make him give the right cause of Being.

*Romance's and New-Atlantides*, I shall gladly embrace as pleasant and glorious entertainements from specious and Ambrosian wits. But for true knowledge of causes, having no cause to expect, I will not hope.

Sir *Walter Raleigh* saith exceeding well, that the Cheese-wife knoweth that Runnet curdleth Cheese, but

Like *Plato's* and *Mr Francis Bacon's*,

✓

but the Philosopher knoweth not how.

All this while I doe not reject an industrious search after wisdom, though the wisest of men saith, *He that increaseth wisdom, increaseth griefe.*

*Verulan:  
Augment.  
Scient.*

I doe only, with Sir Francis Bacon, condemne *doctrinam phantasticam, litigiosam, fucatam, & mollem*; a nice, unnecessary, prying into those things which profit not.

Too great exactnesse in this Learning, hath caused our Meteorologists to blush when their confidence hath proved but a Vapour. Too great hopes of discovering the mysterie of nature, hath caused some, contrary to the authority of Scripture,  
contrary



contrary to the opinion of  
*Julius Cesar, Picus Miran-*  
*dula, Cornelius à Lapide, Io-*  
*an. Barclaim, cum multis ali-*  
*is*, to attribute an *unwar-*  
*ranted* power to the starres  
over our bodies.

But this ensueth, while  
we follow, for learning, what  
is not. And so, that noble  
comprehensive activity, the  
soule of man, is hindered  
from entertaining in its  
place more generous, more  
usefull, and sublimated  
Truths.

How would the soule  
improve, if all *Aristotles*  
*Materia prima*, *Plato's Mens*  
*Platonica*, *Hermes Trisme-*  
*gistus* his *or. & abys.* were  
converted into some spiri-  
tuall *light* & the soule might  
soare and raise it selfe up to  
Univer-

Universall Being, bathe it  
it selfe in those stately, deep,  
and glorious streames of  
of *Vnity*, see God in *Iesus*  
*Christ*, the first, chiefe, and  
sole cause of all Being: It  
would not then containe it  
selfe within particular rivu-  
lers, in whose shallow wa-  
ters it can encounter no-  
thing but sand or pebbles,  
seeing it may fully delight  
it selfe in the first rise of all  
delight, *Iesus Christ*.

Thus, when you see the  
face of Beauty, you will  
perfectly be assured how  
many the severall pieces  
which make it up, must be,  
what their nature, and their  
severall proportions. So  
shall you with certainty de-  
scend to knowledge of ex-  
istences, essences, when you  
shall

shall rest in one universall  
cause: and Metaphysicks,  
Mathematicks, and Logick  
will happily prove *one*, while  
they teach the variations of  
*Vnity* through severall num-  
bers. All particular Scien-  
ces will be subordinate, and  
particular applications of  
these. So all shall be, accor-  
ding to *Ficinus*, *Circulus bo-  
ni per bonum in bonum redi-  
ens*; and the face of divine  
Beauty shall bee unveiled  
through all.

H

CHAP.

## CHAP. XVI.

*The unhappy fruits of Division, in other parts of Learning, made manifest.*

**C**ast your eye on Morall Philosophy, and see how the truth is darkened by distinctions and divisions; How our Masters have set up in the same soule, Two fountaines of Reason, the *Will*, and the *Vnderstanding*. Have they not *virtutes Intellectuales & Morales*? Is it not a great question, *Vtrum Prudentia sit Virtus Moralis? Vtrum Summum Bonum sit in Intellectu, an Voluntate? Vtrum Prudentia possit separari à Virtute Morali? Vtrum Virtus Moralis sita sit in Appetitu Rationali,*

*nali, an Sensitive?*

I say, these questions, especially the dividing of the soule into so many faculties, enthrones many reasonable Beings in the soule. For, when the *will* entertaineth or rejecteth the proposition of the *understanding*, shee must doe it one of these three wayes: Either by an *instinct*; and this men will not have; for, *hoc est brutum*. Or by *chance*; and this many reject; for then she hath no *liberty*. Or by *discourse*; and this most pitch upon; for then she doth exercise *vim illam imperatricem*, which I reade of amongst them, but understand not.

Now, if they conclude upon this *third* way. What

H 2 is

Many reasonable Beings, placed by Philosophy in the Soule.

is this *Discourse*, but the Work of an *Vnderstanding*? if the *will* act that way, which is, or ought to be to the *Vnderstanding proprium quarto modo*; Is not then the *will* an *Vnderstanding*?

Thus like an unskillfull Artist, they mince with distinctions; they *whet*, till there be no more *Steele*: and whilst they would *sharpen*, they *annihilate*: Whilst they would *inlarge*, they *overthrow* the Soule. They create names, and say, with *Ajax*, they are *Vlysses*, and so fight with them. They do, as one saith very well, giving *Passion* eyes, make Reason blind; raising the *will*, they ruine the *Vnderstanding*. *Termini nul-*

Eurip.  
Tragud.

los

*los habent terminos.* The poore Soule oppressed with black Melancholy, beleeveth some part of his body as big as a house: and no man can, in his thought, passe, unlesse he remove it: Even so doe those men.

But what may not bee expected from That happy Inventer, and bold Abetter of errors, who with much confidence maintaineth the eternity of the World, against *Hermes, Museus, Orpheus, Anaxagoras, Linus, &c.* Yet that they may *insanire cum ratione*, they say, that if you raise not up some faculty to contend with the *Vnderstanding*, the *Vnderstanding* seeing right, must ever do right, and

H 3 that

that we by wofull experience know to bee otherwise.

I confesse, whilst the *Vnderstanding* seeth light and right (I now discourse of the *Vnderstanding*, *Will*, *Affections*, &c. in their termes) it doth right; for, seeing and doing is all one; for the act of the Soule is but seeing or discerning. But that *Vnderstanding*, which now did see right perfectly, at the same instant is blind, even in a grosse, absurd thing: and so the effect and birth of it is but darknesse and folly.

In Metaphysicks, with what curious nets do they intangle their hearers? certainly, that should be stiled the Art or Science of Disputes

Seeing  
and doing  
one in the  
Soule as  
knowing  
and wil-  
ling.

Vanity of  
disputes in  
Metaphy-  
sicks.



sputes and *querē's*; for the very Being and *subiectum Metaphysices*, is strongly disputed. Some will have *ens tantum*, the universall nature of *Being*: Others, substances abstract from matter, as Angels, Spirits, Soules of men, to bee the subject of this Learning; And as it beginneth, so it groweth into thousands of disputes.

As, *Vtrum differentia possunt esse sub eodem genere cum illo quod differre faciunt? Vtrum universale sit aliquid reale, an notionale tantum? Unde rerum individuatione exoriatur?*

If I should go through Logick, *Mediocre* artem, Mathematicall Sciences: I should but weary you with

Darknesse  
in Divini-  
ty through  
the igno-  
rance of  
unity.

Faith and  
Repent-  
ance coe-  
vall.

variety of opinions.

Even *Divinity* it selfe is darkened with mists of inextricable questions. The questions about *Faith* and *Love*, are sufficient to fill the world with perpetuall quarrels ; As, whether *Faith* precedeth *Repentance* ? which learned Master *Pemble* hath sweetly determined by making both *Faith* and *Repentance* fruits of *semen vivificum*. Whether *Faith* be a particular application of Christ to my selfe, or onely a bare spirituall beleefe, that Christ is the Son of God ? Which Reverend, holy, learned Master *Cotton*, hath most acutely, most truly cleared, by proving that *Faith* can bee nothing but

a laying hold of that promise which God hath made. Now, that promise is, *That, he that beleeveth that Christ is the Sonne of God, shall be saved.*

The general promise, the object of faith.

Whether faith be a believing that I am saved, or depending upon God for salvation? And here *Bellarmino* hath with mighty wit assaulted our side; for, faith he, if believe be to believe I am saved, I was saved without faith. If believe be to believe that God will give me grace to be saved, I believe before I have grace, before I have faith. Which know, I know not how to dissolve, but by opening with Reverend Mr. *Cotton* That (and this is another *Quare.*)

H 5

We

*Declarativè*

We are saved by faith, only *declarativè*. I am saved, not only in the eternall decree, without faith, by Gods free gift (that all consent to) but even in the execution. And when God hath pleased to take me out of eternall darknesse; then faith discovereth to me that I am to be saved; and so, making faith to be a manifestation of that to me, that I am saved, *Bellarmines* objection is answered.

There are many other Questions, but I dare not so much as mention them.

If wee should but survey the disciplinable part of Divinity, we should be confounded with Chiliads of disputes, all which I will wrap up in one, *scil.*

Whether

Whether there be a pre-  
script forme of Church-  
government?

Are not the two Testa-  
ments expositors of the two  
Tables? Do they leave us  
any latitude in any other of  
the Commandements? why  
should we then think, that  
*That Commandement* which  
God hath honoured in the  
second place, should be for-  
gotten? Truly, had the  
Learned Papists so done,  
they would never have ex-  
punged it.

Are not we as unable to  
prescribe the *manner* as the  
*matter* of Gods worship? If  
we were left to our selves,  
should wee not institute  
*cringings, crouchings*, all  
those ceremonies of *will-*  
*worship*, which carry a vo-  
luntary

The ill  
conse-  
quence of  
the divisi-  
on be-  
tween do-  
ctrine and  
discipline.

✓  
 . .  
 Doctrine  
 of matter  
 in worship;  
 Discipline  
 of manner,  
 both are  
 Doctrine,  
 both pre-  
 scribed by  
 the same  
 God.

✓  
 . .  
 .  
 The mon-  
 strous ef-  
 fects of  
 division  
 made ma-  
 nifest in  
 other pei-  
 ces of Di-  
 vinity.

Intary outward visible shew  
 of humility, but give the  
 heart leave to play the  
 Trewant? If ever distincti-  
 ons did harm, here they have  
 beene deadly poyson: for,  
 Doctrine and Discipline are  
 all one. For, what is *Dis-  
 cipline* but that Doctrine  
 of the manner of Gods wor-  
 ship? wherein we ought to  
 bee as faithfull, as in any  
 point of Divinity: and this  
 will certainly appeare one  
 day, when God shall with  
 pittyleffe holy scorne, aske  
*some*, Who hath required  
 these things at your hands?

But, to conclude; give  
 me leave to shew you how  
 these exorbitant wits have  
 raised a *Babel*, have cast *Pe-  
 lion* upon *Ossa*; and from  
 thence discharged the Ba-  
 listæ

listæ of their ignorance, against the Throne of Eternity, against God himselfe.

The Schooles for many ages, have looked upon the way of Gods knowledge of things, under two notions; *simplicis intelligentia*, & *pura visionis*. I confesse, I see not the end of this distinction. For, if Gods Power and Will be all one, (which I think no man disputeth) all the wayes of knowledge, that can bee in God, must bee confined in that one notion of *simplicis intelligentia*.

I doe seeme (if I mistake not) to maintaine this position by an evident demonstration, thus;

Is there any that denyeth God to be *purus actus* & doth

NOT

The weak-  
nesse of  
the distin-  
ction *Sci-  
entia sim-  
plicis intel-  
ligentia*, &  
*pura visio-  
nis*.

not every body say, that in God there is no *potentia*? If God then bee *actus*, and not *potentia*, all things were, that ever shall be, *ab aeterno* under a decree; and so, what hee could doe, hee did doe, and can doe no more.

Yet, that Truths may come more cleerely and easily to our apprehension, I shall allow the use of the distinction, so that they improve it only for *memory*, and doe not expect any *reality* from it.

But some, not content with this distinction, have found out another, which discovereth a meane parentage, by the very name, it is called *Media scientia*. I will not contend with it in the

*Scientia  
media dis-  
cussed.*



the power of those arguments, whereby our Divines have so often left it spiritlesse and helplesse. I shall only from this point of Unity, shew the vanity of it.

If this *sciencia* be one with that which wee allow, then is it but nominall and vaine. If it be different, you make two in God: for, if I over-value not my former ratiocination, I have proved it cleerely that *scientia simplicis intelligentia* carrieth forth as much of God as is discernable to our darknesse; and making two in God, you exalt two Gods; and whilst you finde two Gods, you lose the true God, which is but only one, an eternall Unity. And thus whilst men gaze  
 conti-

- continually in search of cau-
- ses, they blinde themselves,
- and know not effects.

## CHAP. XVII.

*A Recapitulation of former instances, with some additions of a question or two more.*

In what  
sense in-  
termedi-  
ate causes  
may be  
allowed.

**I**f Confesse there is a secondary intermediate Being, which you may call a *Cause*; which in our language, doth precede and produce another; the observation of which, is very fitting, so that wee search and puzzle not our selves with the grounds and Reasons of this precedency.

As,

As, apply fire to combustible matter, and it will burn; and if you call (which in some sense you may call) this application, the cause of burning: I dispute not onely the search into the nature of wood and fire, and how the fire doth work upon the wood, and how the wood can be both passive and active, *Simul & Semel*; for, they say, *Nulla est actio quin sit reactio*, this is That I desire to shun; for, *intus exstans prohibet alienum*; whilst we entertain our selves with these poore Sophismes of wit, we lose that glory which the immortall soule thirsts after.

But if our spirits, and the light of our reason be dim;  
Let us goe to the forge of  
the

✓ Division  
the policy  
of the  
Prince of  
darknesse.

the Philistines, and sharpen  
our inventions, our apprehensions there; Let us learn  
from the Prince of the aire, who (knowing well, that,  
dissolve the *fasciculus*, and *Iugurtha* his prophecy to his  
children will prove true) taught his Scholars this lesson  
for these many ages, *Divide & impera*; *Divisions*  
✓ and *distractions*, being the  
.. *great road of all error*.

And if you long, with the  
Israelites, to have a King, as  
your neighbours have; and  
you desire to speak in their  
language: When the soule  
entertaineth light, say it  
doth *understand*. When it  
doth exercise any morall  
vertue, say it *willeth*. When  
you see some things pre-  
cede others, call the one a  
*cause*,

cause, the other an effect: but  
travell not far in the search  
of the source of this cause.  
Doe not make the *will* and  
the *understanding* two facul-  
ties, *Fratrium concordia rara;*  
*Jacob* will supplant *Esau* in  
the Womb. Make there-  
fore the severall Actings of  
the soule, as Rayes of this  
one soule; make these rayes,  
and the soule sending forth  
these rayes, a perpetuall e-  
manation Divine: and so  
by these degrees of truth,  
mount up into the armes of  
Eternity, and he will take  
care of you, that you shall  
not dash your seete against  
the stone of *free will*: that  
you shall not overthrow all  
faith, by starting so many  
nice questions in the point  
of faith.

Recapitu-  
lation of  
all.

If

If you follow this rule, and see all things in the glasse of Unity, you will not lose all Arts and Sciences in the Wood of Divisions and Subdivisions *in infinitum*; you shall be more substantiall, than to make Substance and Accidents Two; neither will it ever happen, that you maintaine transubstantiation, by affirming that Accidents can *habere in nullo subiecto*.

You shall not make to your selfe a God of contradiction, dividing the *will* and *power* of God. Both which in God, is God; and so but *one*. You will not maintaine two Covenants, one of workes, another of grace, seeing grace is gracelesse without workes, and  
Works

Works worthlesse without  
grace.

If God shall give you to  
walke by this light, practi-  
call questions will be laid  
aside, as well as Theoreti-  
call : you will not dispute  
whether you ought to be  
more holy on one day (as  
at a Sacrament) then at o-  
ther times ; for, you will  
then know, that these Scrip-  
tures expresse fully the rule  
you must walke by ; *Pray  
continually; rejoyce evermore:  
blessed is he that feareth al-  
wayes : Be ye holy [not by fits  
and starts, but] as I am holy;  
serving me alwayes, with all  
your heart, your might, your  
affections.* So that every day,  
every duty, is to you an  
holy day, an ordinance di-  
vine.

And

The sense  
of the  
Sabbaths  
command.

And if any man shall say,  
Why doth God adde this  
parcell, *Remember that thou  
keep holy the Sabbath day, &c.*  
and this strict injunction,  
before you approach the  
Table of the Lord, *Let every  
man examine himselfe, and so  
let him eat?*

You will be able to an-  
swer, that you ought not to  
be more holy in one day, in  
one duty, than in another;  
for, you must be all one, *Sem-  
per idem.*

And secondly, you will  
be able to prove, that the  
weight of this injunction, is  
not to adde any other holi-  
nesse to the day, or the ordi-  
nance, than a holinesse of se-  
paration.

For, a holinesse of inhæ-  
rence, cannot fall any  
where,



where, but upon a reasonable creature. The Temple had no more.

For, with the leave of learned and holy Master *Cawdry*, Time & Place are incapable of any other sanctification.

But the stresse of these and the like precepts, lyeth here. We ought indeed alwayes to keepe a Sabbath. Every bread and every water, ought to be a confirmation of our faith and of our graces.

But God considering that we are lower than the Angels (and them hee hath charged with folly;) that we are infirme; that we cannot alwayes keep the bow bent: If we cannot be holy all the weeke, if we cannot be pure at our own Tables; as who can?

All things  
Ordinances.

The intention of  
speciall Ordinances.

can? yet, if we will remember the Sabbath, and if wee will come to that feast of marrow and farnesse with a wedding-garment, and at other times doe our best (though weak) indeavours, he will behold no iniquity in us.

We shall not be perplexed, how farre we ought to mourne for the sinnes of others, the sinnes of the times, or our owne lives. [And these are intangling questions to many tweco spirits.] For, drawing all things to an unity, we shall know that sorrow and joy may meet in the same subject at once; they must be both in the actings of faith. Wee must not sorrow as without hope; We may not lose

Mourning  
and joy  
reconciled.

lose our Faith in our teares;  
Our teares must be teares of  
joy; Wee may think, that  
we have sinned, and so sigh;  
but at the same instant, wee  
must know we have a Savi-  
our, and so triumph. And if  
I were now all gore blood,  
would I not now goe to the  
Chirurgians? Truly the grea-  
ter my sin, the sooner ought  
to be my return, the higher  
my Faith. But great and  
inlarged Faith, cannot be  
without exultation and ma-  
gnificats.

Thus could we lay aside  
foolish questions, could we  
seek into our hearts, accor-  
ding to the Poets advice,  
*Ne te quæsieris extra*, and  
not into the causes, and the  
Being of causes, things too  
high for us; We might have

I

an

an Heaven here, we might  
see how Christ is one with  
G O D, and wee one with  
Christ; so wee in Christ,  
one with God.

If wee cannot reach the  
perfection of this know-  
ledge, yet let us come as  
neere it as we can, for the  
true knowledge of God  
in Christ, is life  
everlasting.

(\*)

A



## A Postscript.

**A**N D now, Sir, I have with what brevity I can, run through, what I never intended to speake of. I had prepared a little in lieu of This, upon the nature of *Prophecy*, which I now shall reserve for a Discourse upon the fourteenth Chapter of the second to Corinth: But it was with me in this case, as it is with the soule, prostrating it selfe at the throne of grace. It designs to breath it selfe out in confession, but is suddenly raised up in

to sweet exultation. It intends a *Magnificat*, but by some unexpected irresistible power, it is dissolved into teares; which never did, nor ever can happen in a *Forme*, as might appeare by ventilating the opposit arguments, if opportunity prevailed as well as reason.

I had nothing in my resolution, but, by a word or two, to mediate in the behalfe of these lines, a free and a friendly access, to Your more serious and usefull studies. But (*qua fatus nescio*) I have let fall my plummet into waters too deepe, that if you lend not your favourable construction in the perusal, I must suffer. I confesse my confidence in your Gentleness is

great;

great; I shall therefore, without any further plea, after this long Parenthesis, give you a short account of what these papers beare.

You have here my poore thoughts upon the twenty-fourth Chap. of *Matth.* that I was forced to, because I quote it, more than once, in sense differing from our Commentators: yea, I was necessitated to run through the whole Chapter. It will appeare in costly robes, adorned with lofty and glorious language, sweetned by many a pleasant and cleare Simile, quickned by divers acute and learned Criticisms. *These, none of these are mine!* My Cabinet enshrineth no such Treasure. I confesse, to save the la-

\* Matth. 24

bour of contending with *Pareus*, and others, I delivered to a Friend of Yours, and Mine, onely the *substratum* of the Discourse, desiring him, from those principles to undertake my adversaries. In lieu of this, he returned me the *Chapter* \*, imbellished with so much wit and learning, that I durst not call it mine, and so thought to have suppressed it; and Had done so, but that from the Law of friendship, you may challenge a share in what is His; and from that reason it lieth now, and is presented to Your view, hoping (for his sake, not for mine) to finde grace in your eyes.

You have also, my Thoughts, upon the twentieth



tieth of *Revelations*, because therein I have done Two things.

First, According to my Modell, answered your three *Queries*.

Secondly, Discovered my opinion concerning the *Millenaries*. I finde That point entertained by many learned and pious men, under various and different notions.

The first who were of that opinion, lived immediately after *S. Iohn*, as *Papias*, *Irenaeus*, and so on; in after ages, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, *Augustine*, cum multis alijs: these men did a little *Alcoranize*; for, with *Mahomet*, they cast all the glory of it, into the outward pomp the Church should then enjoy:

I 4 Which

Various  
sorts of  
*Millenar-  
ies*.

The first  
too car-  
nally

which is but as the body of that other spirituall beauty, wherein the Church of God shall at that time be more than exceedingly resplendent. Yet these men have happily fixed upon the due Season, expecting them at the pouring out of the *seventh Vial*, a thousand yeares before the end of the World.

The second only  
Spiritual.

Of latter dayes, most famous and glorious Lights, as *Calvin, Bèza, Iunius, Tremelius, Broughton, &c.* have wrapt up all the glory under a spirituall notion, robbing both it and other Scriptures, of that sweetness; whereon even *Our Soules*, but especially *Our children* shall feed, as upon Marrow and Fatnesse; where-

wherewith we shall be refreshed as with Wine refined upon the lees. *Contraries* may sometimes (in some sense) be *Errors*; the *others* erred because they have not the *spirituall*; and *these* have mistaken, not observing the *temporal* glory of this thousand years.

These last men are succeeded by a generation of *Worthies*, who have come nearer to the Truth; yet (if I mistake not) have missed it; and some of these are *Alstedius*, (who justly meriteth the Anagram of *Sedulitas*) *Made* and some others; who indeed expect a time of glory, confuting the first men, because they made theirs too carnall

A third  
sort, in  
some  
things too  
literall.

carnall. Yet doe they faile themselves, by placing the time after the burning of the world with materiall fire, spoken of in *Peter*; and joyning with it their opinion, of the resurrection of the Martyrs, which I do not wholly condemne, though therein I am not yet so cleere.

Lastly, we have the Reverend man Mr. *Brightman*, against whom I will not now dispute, whose opinion, seeing I must oppose it, when I mention it, I will not now name. For hee ought always à me non sine honore nominari. *Pliny* saith *Venerabilis Catonis e-brietas*, and so say I of *Brightman*, The very Errors (if errors) of *Brightman* have

have their *beauty*: I must  
confesse, if God hath been  
pleased to discover light  
to me, I have borrowed  
from him. If there be any  
thing of sweet, I have ga-  
thered it from the strong.  
And I do seriously pro-  
test I have not with *Sea-  
liger* the Souldier; underta-  
ken *Cardan*, that his ruines  
may be my rise.

No, no, I honour his  
very Urne, and do beleewe  
that one day I shall see the  
Jews very zealous in rai-  
sing to him some stately  
*Mausoleum*, who hath been  
the first meanes of quick-  
ning the affections of Chri-  
stians to pray for their re-  
turne.

Sir, I have overtired your  
Gentlenesse, and your Pa-  
tience.

rience, therefore now give  
 me leave to refresh your  
 spirits; Let me in a word  
 say here, what I prove more  
 amply elsewhere; the days  
 are at hand; We shall see  
 the Laying of the *first*  
 stone, if not the rearing of  
 the structure to some good  
 height.

I know there is a Great  
 Reader, who, though hee  
 hath *Lyne* his eyes, yet u-  
 sing overmuch the Septu-  
 agenary Spectacles of anti-  
 quate Antiquity, loseth to  
 himselfe, and, by his justly-  
 merited authority, robbeth  
 others of, this sweet truth,  
 of the Church her appro-  
 ching glory, which is in  
 my apprehension, as *blood*  
 to the veines, as *life* to  
 the blood, as *spirit* to the  
 life,

life, as *all* to the Spirit. But certainly, while he thinketh the *witnesses*, to be yet unburied, hee doth bury two witnesses, which are as able to bring Christ to his Espousals, as the two post-knights were to naile him to the Crosse.

I know there is another worthy, who hath for many yeares stayed Christs fainting Spouse with flagons of Generous and Good Wine, who adjourneth our happinesse by expecting the sad downfull of the two *witnesses*. But (as I have, I hope, cleerely proved elsewhere) That is past. *Macte ergo gaudio*, Tune up your ten-stringed instrument: Let us heare that pleasant melody of a Christian

stian Hymen; O Hymenæe!  
Let Your sweet spirit sing,  
and We will dance: For  
certainly ere long, all teares  
shall be wiped away from  
our eyes, and perfect frui-  
tion of Love will cast out  
Feare.


*And now, I commit You, and  
Your Hopefull, Flourishing Stu-  
dies, to the expectation, and  
advancement of these glories  
which make way for  
the coming of our  
Saviour.*

And to Him alone  
be the glory

---

*FINIS.*





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verall Chapters handled  
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My Soule y<sup>e</sup> Throan, And my  
Command Extends  
To all y<sup>e</sup> Sences Passions and  
Theyr Ends  
None of these Subject dare  
Contraine A Treason  
But all are Humbled to the  
Rule of Reason  
And Such An Empire (wherebut  
are all Controul'd  
Excell's y<sup>e</sup> Best of Kingdoms &  
in this World.  
How Com'st thou to this Empire?  
whose Direction  
Advanc'd thy Soul to this so  
Great perfection  
The poore Man thus. Silence And  
Meditation  
With Thoughts Divine & Holy.  
Contemplation  
So weaned, and Wone me to the  
Things Above  
My Heart grew Fixed to the  
God of Love  
who for y<sup>e</sup> worldly Love I lost  
did Give



Who For y<sup>e</sup> Worly Love Lost  
did Give  
Himselfe, in me, and for Him  
to Live. Amen

forma quæ dat esse est  
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